


LEVERAGING INTERDEPENDENCE TO AVOID ARMED CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2008

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| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE | | | | <i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i> |
|---|--------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. | | | | |
| 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 13-06-2008 | | 2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis | | 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2007 – JUN 2008 |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Leveraging Interdependence to Avoid Armed Conflict Between the US and China | | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER | | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) MacKay, Deborah L., Major, U.S. Air Force | | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER | | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301 | | 8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER | | |
| 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) | | |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited | | | | |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | | | | |
| 14. ABSTRACT Today, many analysts predict China's growing economy and military strength will eventually create a peer competitor for the United States (US). Others fear China's globally expanding influence will threaten US national security interests and question whether the rise of China as an economic and political world power can be accomplished without armed conflict, especially armed conflict with the US. The purpose of the thesis is to identify key friction points between the US and China, discover areas of interdependence, and discuss management options that can be used to minimize friction and avoid a military conflict. The study provides a focused look at the US-China relationship and offers insights into how the US strategy with respect to China could be shaped to enable a more informed, tailored, and effective strategy. | | | | |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS Friction, Interdependence, Strategy, Globalization, US, China, Deterrence, Engagement, Negotiation, Crisis Management, Culture | | | | |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: | | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U) | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 111 | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |
| a. REPORT (U) | b. ABSTRACT (U) | | | c. THIS PAGE (U) |

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

LEVERAGING INTERDEPENDENCE TO AVOID ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA, by Major Deborah L. MacKay, 111 pages

Today, many analysts predict China's growing economy and military strength will eventually create a peer competitor for the United States (US). Others fear China's globally expanding influence will threaten US national security interests and question whether the rise of China as an economic and political world power can be accomplished without armed conflict, especially armed conflict with the US. The purpose of the thesis is to identify key friction points between the US and China, discover areas of interdependence, and discuss management options that can be used to minimize friction and avoid a military conflict. The study provides a focused look at the US-China relationship and offers insights into how the US strategy with respect to China could be shaped to enable a more informed, tailored, and effective strategy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My committee encouraged me to view the world from another's point of view and for that I am incredibly thankful for this opportunity and their time. Mrs. Elizabeth Brown is the thesis candidate's unsung hero. She puts the students first, and I owe her much thanks. Finally, the thesis would not have been accomplished without the full and unwavering support of my husband, Sean, who spent many hours without me. I could not have done this without him or his understanding.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|---|------|
| MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE | iii |
| ABSTRACT..... | iv |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..... | v |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS..... | vi |
| ACRONYMS..... | viii |
| ILLUSTRATIONS | ix |
| TABLES | x |
| CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| Proposed Research Questions..... | 5 |
| Assumptions..... | 5 |
| Limitations | 6 |
| Scope..... | 6 |
| Significance of the Study | 7 |
| Summary | 7 |
| CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW | 8 |
| Current Operating Environment | 8 |
| Globalization..... | 11 |
| Friction Points..... | 14 |
| Ideologically Differing Points of View..... | 16 |
| Taiwan's Independence | 23 |
| Energy and Natural Resources | 24 |
| Cyberspace..... | 27 |
| Space | 31 |
| Understanding Intentions | 32 |
| Strategy | 39 |
| Management Options | 48 |
| CHAPTER 3 ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY | 58 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS..... | 63 |
| Friction Points..... | 64 |
| Friction Point 1: Ideologically Differing Points of View | 68 |
| Friction Point 2: Taiwan’s Independence | 69 |
| Friction Point 3: Access to Energy and Natural Resources | 71 |
| Friction Point 4: Freedom in the Cyber Domain | 72 |
| Friction Point 5: Freedom in the Space Domain..... | 73 |
| Interdependence | 75 |
| Friction Point Management Options..... | 79 |
| Ideologically Differing Points of View..... | 81 |
| Taiwan’s Independence | 82 |
| Access to Energy and Natural Resources | 83 |
| Cyberspace..... | 84 |
| The Space Domain | 85 |
| CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS | 87 |
| Conclusions..... | 87 |
| Recommendations..... | 93 |
| REFERENCE LIST | 95 |
| INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST | 101 |

ACRONYMS

| | |
|---------|---|
| CCP | Chinese Communist Party |
| DIME | Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic instruments of national power as used by the United States of America |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| EU | European Union |
| FMSO | Foreign Military Studies Office |
| JP | Joint Publication |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NCP | National Comprehensive Power |
| NSS | National Security Strategy |
| PLA | People's Liberation Army |
| PRC | People's Republic of China |
| UN | United Nations |
| US | United States |
| USPACOM | US Pacific Command |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

ILLUSTRATIONS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| Figure 1. US Strategy Formulation Model..... | 41 |
| Figure 2. China's Science of Strategy Model..... | 45 |
| Figure 3. Strategic Concept Estimate Process Approach..... | 59 |

TABLES

| | Page |
|---|------|
| Table 1. Strategic Concept Estimate Interests Comparison..... | 61 |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Today, many analysts predict China's growing economy and military strength will eventually create a peer competitor for the United States (US). Others fear China's globally expanding influence will threaten US national security interests and question whether the rise of China as an economic and political world power can be accomplished without armed conflict, especially armed conflict with the US. The purpose of the thesis is to identify key friction points between the US and China, discover areas of interdependence, and discuss management options that can be used to minimize friction and avoid a military conflict. The study provides a focused look at the US-China relationship and offers insights into how the US *National Security Strategy (NSS)* might reflect a more informed, tailored, and effective strategy with respect to China.

The thesis will briefly touch on the cultural, economic, diplomatic, and political factors central to this question but will focus specifically on those aspects that may cause a military response by either nation. In doing so, the thesis will identify the national interests of each country, relevant international partnerships, economic ties, and those national interests that contribute to their interdependence. Then, the thesis will analyze the conflicting interests having the potential for friction. Finally, knowing the mutual interests and points of divergence, the thesis will identify the capabilities available to manage the relationship to avoid aggravating the friction points. Collectively, these capabilities are commonly referred to as the “instruments of national power” and consist of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means or DIME. The US applies these capabilities synergistically and uses the military instrument as a last resort. China

looks at national power comprehensively, meaning they look at the above factors similar to the US but also take into account all factors relevant to a state's power base. This would include other factors like national interests, culture, religion, history, war potential, the enemy's war potential, and the current international environment (Peng and Yao 2005, 40).

In order to positively influence another nation, the interests of both nations must first be understood. These areas will be examined in detail later in the thesis, but generally, the US frames their national interests by two overarching ideals or pillars. The first is the promotion of freedom, justice, and human dignity (U.S. President 2006, 2). The second pillar is leading the community of democracies to confront disease, terrorism, natural disasters, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (U. S. President 2006, 2). China's interests are found in six main areas: national territory, national security, national sovereignty, national development, national stability, and national dignity (Peng and Yao 2005, 39-43). An overarching statement of China's interests is also found in, *China's National Defense in 2006*, wherein, "China is committed to building a moderately prosperous society in an all-around way and a socialist harmonious society, and it enjoys steady economic growth, political stability, ethnic harmony, and social progress" (People's Republic of China (PRC) 2006, 3).

These dissimilar interests bring tension to the international arena and to each nation individually as each nation's interests competes (or seems to compete) directly with the interests of another. This competition can seem to escalate to a "friction point." Friction points are those areas where the interests of one interfere with the interests of another. Unless appropriate action is taken to reduce the friction, escalation results and

may lead to armed conflict to resolve or remove the source of friction. Some of the main areas for friction between China and the US are: (1) ideology, (2) Taiwanese independence, (3) freedom of access in the cyber and space domains, (4) freedom of access to resources, (5) presence in either's perceived “backyard,” and (6) vying for regional leadership in East Asia.

Despite the several areas of concern or friction, the US and China now are intertwined economically, politically, and technologically, creating a growing diplomatic, social, and economic interdependence. These nations are diplomatically tied or associated with more than ten major international partnerships or organizations, to include holding permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Economically, China and the US are major trading partners. China is the US' second largest trading partner and the US is China's third largest partner. Each country needs the capacity of the other to feed their voracious demand for commodities resulting in jobs, profit, and access to other resources. “The US is China’s largest overseas market and second largest source of foreign direct investment” as the Congressional Research Service reported to Congress in January 2007 (Lum and Nanto 2007, 3). Additionally, US exports to China are growing faster than to any other country worldwide. Finally, the US and China are growing in their social ties due to globalization and information access via the global grid. This growth in information access and the growing demand from their populace for more access weighs heavily on China’s Communist Party (CCP) leadership as it attempts to balance national unity, preserve the communist party, and allow freedom of expression and speech. The 2008 Olympics in Beijing and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010 put further international pressure on China’s leadership to reform its information and social practices. While the

CCP attempts to manage these challenges, the social ties of the Chinese people with the international community grows daily leaving Beijing more concerned about CCP survival and national unity.

All of these areas of interdependence, friction, and exclusive interests have to be managed carefully so that each nation's interests are served. The challenge is to search for areas of commonality, activities, or policies that are mutually beneficial and serve to build trust to allow the instruments of national power to be effectively applied. The goal is to use the diplomatic, informational, and economic means while leaving the military instrument in reserve to reinforce, if required, or used only as a last resort. China states their rise is peaceful and is an effort to seek harmony internationally to enable them to support their people. However, recent cyber attacks, continuing industrial espionage, and increased military spending and technological advances do not appear to support China's assertions and only serves to excite US analysts who dread a "near peer" and question the true intentions of the CCP (PRC 2006, 4).

In order to identify key friction points between the US and China, discover areas of interdependence, and discuss management options that can be used to minimize friction and avoid a military conflict, the study will look at this problem from a Chinese perspective and with an eye for appreciating the advantages of a constructive China-US relationship. The analysis will follow a methodological approach based on the elements of the Strategic Estimate taught by the US Army's Command and General Staff College, Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Broadly, the methodology reviews: the strategic setting (competing and complementary interests and objectives); national guidance (security strategies, sources,

and instruments of national power); national vulnerabilities (social, economic, military); and then analyzes management options to positively affect the US-China relationship.

Proposed Research Questions

The primary research question of the thesis is: What management options can be used to effectively influence China in order to manage the friction points, reinforce US-China interdependence, and ultimately avoid a military conflict? In order to answer the primary question, key secondary questions are:

1. What are the key friction points between the US and China?
2. How are the US and China economically interdependent?
3. What cultural aspects generate overriding principles in China's and the US' decision making about their national interests?
4. How do the US and China develop their national strategy and what is their current strategy?
5. What is the intended endstate of China's military, economic, and diplomatic expansion and how does the US influence that endstate?
6. What alliances, treaties, or international organizations affect the US-China relationship, or could be leveraged to assure the peace?
7. What methods can we use to avoid a military conflict?

Assumptions

China's aggressive international pursuit of resources and influence will continue due to the economic expansion and social reforms ongoing in China. This pursuit will continue to challenge the status quo and force US decision makers to reevaluate their

perceptions of China's intentions. The resultant work will seek to examine the competitive interests and how those interests can be accommodated without conflict. An understanding of Chinese culture and China's decision-making processes is essential when forming assessments of actions or intended actions. During the evaluation of China's intentions, decision makers must weigh the total cost of armed conflict with China. Conflict is defined herein as a force on force conventional fight (non-nuclear). In that vein, for this thesis, it is assumed that war with China is unnecessary to meet US national objectives, and the thesis will explain why efforts to avoid conflict are in the US and China's national interests.

Limitations

Information for this study will be limited to unclassified sources as found in the US Army's Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), civilian World Wide Web, and open source databases, reporting, and information.

Scope

Cultural knowledge of China should inform decision makers and enable their ability to better influence how the Chinese think, what they decide, and what triggers their decisions. Therefore, although not a cultural paper, the thesis has to acknowledge, in part, these critical factors while the instruments of national power are being considered. Last, the thesis will focus mainly on those factors that may cause a military response from either the US or China.

Significance of the Study

The intent of this paper is to provide a focused look at the US-China relationship and provide insights into how the US NSS with respect to China could be shaped to enable a more informed, tailored, and effective strategy. The thesis will identify key friction points between the US and China, discover areas of interdependence, and discuss management options that can be used to minimize friction and avoid a military conflict.

Summary

Seeking common ground for international peace is usually in a nation's best interest. This study will look for US-China common interests and how their interdependence can be used for the international "common good." This chapter has provided a brief introduction to the thesis. Chapter 2 will provide detailed insight into the literature reviewed for the thesis, and chapter 3 will lay out the analytical methodology used to analyze the data found while researching the thesis. Analysis of the data found using the research methodology will follow in chapter 4. Chapter 4 also answers the primary research question: What management options can be used to effectively influence China in order to manage the friction points, reinforce US-China interdependence, and ultimately avoid a military conflict? Chapter 5 will conclude the thesis with recommendations to revise the US NSS to reduce friction between the US and China. There may be better ways to leverage each other in the pursuit of national objectives and seek the avoidance of armed conflict between these nuclear-armed nations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of the thesis is to identify key friction points between the US and China, discover areas of interdependence, and discuss management options that can be used to minimize friction and avoid a military conflict. The study provides a focused look at the US-China relationship and offers insights into how the US NSS might reflect a more informed, tailored, and effective strategy with respect to China. Although cultural, economic, diplomatic, political, and military factors may be sources of friction between the two nations; this paper will focus only on those factors that might cause a military reaction. This chapter provides an overview of the literature reviewed to support thesis analysis reflected in chapter 4 and the development of recommendations and conclusions to follow in chapter 5.

Current Operating Environment

According to China's national website (www.china.org.cn/english), China's landmass is third only to Russia and Canada, and shares land borders with fourteen countries (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam) (China Facts and Figures 2005, Location and Territory). Residing in this vast nation are 1.3 billion people, which represents approximately one-fifth of mankind. They comprise fifty-six ethnicities and speak seventy-three different languages. Of the 1.3 billion, fifty-eight percent live in rural areas (China Facts and Figures 2005, Natural Conditions). China is actively involved in thirty-seven partnerships spanning bilateral,

regional, and multilateral organizations to include holding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Medeiros 2007, 38-39). Her economy is thriving and has experienced a boom over the last thirty years. Since 1978 the gross domestic product has increased by a factor of forty, with a 10.7 percent growth rate and the fourth largest economy in the world (Freeman 2007). The US is China's second-largest trading partner, and China is now the third-largest trading partner for the US (after Canada and Mexico) (U.S. Department of State 2007a). China's 1991 entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) has aided her economy and allowed increased international access to her economy and hers to the international community. Finally, and most importantly, the national interests of China shape the current operating environment.

Historically, China focuses internally vice externally wherein their decision to act is measured on how it will benefit China. In 2003, the 16th CCP presented their blueprint of long-term national goals to be achieved by 2020. This blueprint defined a *xiaokang* society, a society where, “the general populace would be able to enjoy a much more abundant and comfortable life” (Choo 2003). The Chinese view national interests as, “the cardinal basis to determine the alignment of a state’s military strategy as well as the starting point and also the destination of its national military strategic guidance” (Peng and Yao 2005, 39). Currently, their interests are found in six main areas: national territory, national security, national sovereignty, national development, national stability, and national dignity. An overarching statement of China’s interests is also found in *China’s National Defense in 2006* wherein, “China is committed to building a moderately prosperous society in an all-around way and a socialist harmonious society, and it enjoys

steady economic growth, political stability, ethnic harmony, and social progress” (PRC 2006, 3).

In order to secure their national interest, they, like all countries, field a military force to defend those interests. China espouses its military is defensive in nature and serves only to secure China’s security, unity, and the interests of national development (PRC 2006, 4). Currently, China’s military is transforming, updating its weaponry, doctrine, logistics, leaning out its frontline combat force, expanding its high-tech capabilities (cyber, space, information), and strengthening its reserve forces. All of these initiatives tie into larger national strategic objectives to mobilize the economy and balance the needs of the military with the needs of civil society (PRC 2006, 22). As a result, the US assesses China’s military as the lead challenger to US capabilities especially for a high-intensity, short duration, high-tech war (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, I).

In contrast to China, the US is the fourth largest country in the world after Russia, Canada, and China. Its population of three hundred and three million represents only 20 percent of China’s and 75 percent of the US population lives in metropolitan areas (U.S. Census Data 2006, 2007). The US shares borders with Mexico and Canada and its landmass is roughly 6 percent of the world’s land area. English is the national language but 18 percent of Americans over the age of five speak a language other than English at home (U.S. State Department 2007b). Additionally, in 2000, 28.4 million or 10.4 percent of the US population were native to countries outside the US while another 27.5 million have one or both parents who were born outside the US (U.S. State Department 2007b). American society is culturally diverse and considered a “melting pot” of immigrants from

almost every nation on Earth. Despite this diversity, the US has found a common purpose and enjoys stability within her borders. The US leads the world in diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities. It is engaged internationally in no less than eighty alliances, agreements, treaties, organizations and protocols chiefly the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), WTO, and the Organization of American States. The US national interests center on promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity; extending prosperity globally, and securing freedom for America and her Allies. A second pillar focuses on leading the community of democracies to confront disease, terrorism, natural disasters, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (U. S. President 2006, 2). Understanding China and the US in their own current operating environment helps to provide context to areas of commonality and areas where they might diverge from each other. Before discussing these areas, one must first understand globalization and its effect on the current operating environment.

Globalization

Globalization, as defined by Mr. Thomas Friedman, is the integration of markets, finance, technology, and telecommunications enabling individuals to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before while also allowing the world to reach us in the same manner (Friedman 2000). Friedman is a Pulitzer Prize winning author for international reporting (and author of *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*) who describes globalization as an all-embracing phenomenon shaped by global capitalism. He offers six no longer separable dimensions: politics, culture, technology, finance, national security, and ecology. Globalization simultaneously intertwines these dimensions via the Internet superhighway and the global

economy. Globalization compels analysts to look beyond the traditional nation-state and her military or economic power. The other instruments of power are now far more productive (informational and diplomatic) in affecting world opinion by influencing, exploiting, denying, or dominating the information spectrum via multiple mediums. The effects of globalization are far reaching and can energize an issue to a crisis-level at lightning speed. Analysts must consider these influences that are beyond geographic borders and long-standing alliances when analyzing threats to national security. Both *China's National Defense in 2006* and the US NSS (2006) address the impacts, effects, and ways to work in this globalized world environment.

Economic impacts to globalization are evident in the boom in trade between the US and China. The Chinese Ambassador to the United States Zhou Wenzhong notes that in just the twenty-seven years after the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations, the bilateral trade volume surged from less than 2.5 billion US dollars in 1979 to 211.6 billion US dollars in 2005, an increase of 80 times (Zhou 2006).

The Internet contributes significantly to the success of globalization. The Internet allows communication barriers to be broken down, offers insight into the means for a better life, and “allows human beings to get to know, understand, and work with each other, and realize the common, but diverse, goals of the humankind” (Gao 2007). In December 2007, Gao Gang wrote, “Develop international cooperation and optimize the Internet environment” for China.org. Gao is currently a Professor and the Executive Dean, School of Journalism, Renmin University of China. Gao also serves as the Executive Director of All-China Journalists’ Association, President of the Journalism and Communications Branch of China Higher Education Association, and Director, Beijing

Internet Media Association. He relates in his article that, “the Internet has integrated [globalized] the entire world into one big body and the network information dissemination system has become a main component of continued human existence and security” (Gao 2007). He notes how the two earthquakes in the South China Sea on 26 December 2006 affected major Internet services due to damage to undersea cables disrupting banking, communication, business, and personal life for people and businesses around the world (Gao 2007). These quakes would not have had such an impact without the Internet and the realities of globalization.

“The development of the Internet integrates countries of the world, breaking regional, ideological, and time boundaries. . . . Communication barriers are gradually breaking down, allowing exploration of the means to a better life and stimulation of an ever-higher intelligence potential” (Gao 2007). Although this is true, it can be a benefit and a curse. It is seen as beneficial as it ties the world together into a “virtual mankind,” but it is also a curse because it allows societal norms to be challenged, governments to be more transparent, and traditional “information giver” roles to be questioned by the masses (Gao 2007). All vulnerabilities that threaten the information sovereignty of a nation may now be viewed as a reason to act offensively or defensively to protect their economy, navigation systems, information grid, government operations, social cohesion for national unity and ultimately, national sovereignty.

When the world is more globalized or interdependent, it is stronger; however, submitting to globalization has inherent risks. Globalization runs contrary to the concept of sovereignty because a nation allows itself to rely on another to provide for their populace thus potentially putting the nation’s stability into the hands of another. In other

words, committing to globalization and allowing another entity to provide for your citizens is to forfeit a portion of your sovereignty and increase your reliance on that entity to exist or prosper

This dynamic also plays out in national influence. Areas where a nation may have had a large global influence (trade) may be diminished as a collection of states or commodities grow in influence. Many believe the effect of globalization will actually bring more peace to the world because nations are more reliant on each other and therefore, warring with each other is actually not in either's best interest or the world's interest. This specifically effects the sharing of resources, security, and economic stability. The US and China have areas where they already rely on each other (economy, resources, world order, international terrorism) and areas where they are more independent of each other (ideology, regional dominance in Asia, human rights). The areas of independence provide insight into potential friction points, misunderstandings, or even confrontation as US and China vie for resources to provide for their people and ultimately the upper hand to influence world affairs to their own advantage in pursuit of their national interests.

Friction Points

According to the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, friction is the clashing between two persons or parties of opposed views. When you can narrow down the areas of opposed views, they become points of friction or friction points (*Merriam-Webster*, s.v. “Friction”). After Chinese President Hu Jintao visited President George Bush at the White House in April 2006, Robert Hormats, vice chairman of Goldman Sachs International and economic official in the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan

administrations noted, “The frictions exist in trade, in political relations, security relations, energy issues . . . and how these countries manage those differences, how they manage those tensions, is really going to be the very important element in shaping the future of the world, economically, and politically, and militarily, over the next decade or two” (Hormats 2006).

China’s official website (www.china.org.cn/eng) commented on the visit between President Hu and Bush stating “harmony between the two countries will bless both sides whereas collision will wreck both. Hence, China and the United States must deepen communication and mutual understanding, and enhance the building of consensus and confidence” (China Facts and Figures 2007, Relations with Major Powers). Despite current efforts to cooperate, friction points remain between China and the US.

Specifically, the differing ideologies of the US and China, independence for Taiwan, unimpeded use of both the cyber and space domains, freedom of access to resources, in-roads into each other’s perceived “backyards,” and vying for regional leadership in East Asia are friction points. The US NSS clearly projects the “spread of freedom and democracy” as a core national interest (U. S. President 2006, 2). This interest provides insight into the first two friction points (ideologically differing points of view and Taiwan’s independence). The NSS is perceived by Beijing as a threat to the socialist government in Beijing, the CCP’s hold on power, and encourages the separatist movement in Taiwan to which China is vehemently opposed. A third major friction point is the use of the cyber domain. The US posits that it is the right of all nations to be free from attack within the cyber domain but the frequent and damaging attacks attributed to hackers in China exacerbates government-to-government relations. Space is the fourth

friction point that has only heightened since the January 2007 anti-satellite test by China. They destroyed one of their own satellites claiming it was a redundant weather satellite raising fears internationally of a new space arms race and safety of flight in space. Fifth, are the economic in-roads that both are undertaking to satisfy their domestic markets, export growth, and a growing appetite for natural resources. The last two areas (in-roads into each other's perceived "backyards" and vying for regional leadership in East Asia) really stem from the major five already mentioned. In light of that, these two areas will not be developed by the thesis but may represent areas for future study.

Ideologically Differing Points of View

While there are disagreements over the friction points inherent in a Sino-American relationship, the potential exists for either country to enforce their national interests through military force. The goal of a national strategy and specifically, a national security strategy, is to project areas of risk to interests that have to be managed, decide how to manage them, and if need be, fight to remove the risk to a nation's interest. In order to promulgate an effective strategy, a state must first understand the other's point of view.

Inherent historical and new challenges as a result of globalization and the way the US and China look at themselves, each other, and the world contribute to the first area of friction and actually contributes to other areas of friction. So, in order to better understand the issues, one must first understand the differing ideological points of view of China and the US. China generally views the world via an internal lens, only engaging or shouldering the burden of an external crisis when it is of direct benefit to China's national interest. The US generally views the world via an external lens willing to engage

or shoulder the burden of an external crisis when it is in line with the national interests of the state, her allies, or friends. The “single lens” of the US represents a “snap shot in time” and all factors focus on this snapshot to which strategy is formed. However, China’s “dual lens” represents a comprehensive view that appears to evolve more with the environment. One Chinese author believes this differing world view automatically puts the two nations at odds before issues are even discussed.

Pang Zhongying notes how the Chinese view themselves as part of an international society and not an international community. Pang is Nankai University’s Director of the Institute of Global Studies in Tianjin, China and is a frequent contributing editor to the US publication, *National Interest*. He delineates a society as a group of actors with shared interests but not an overarching common power or universal standard whereas a community implies most things are shared in common among the actors (Pang 2002). This delineation helps to understand their regional and world view and how calls to join the “international community” go unanswered or rebuffed by the Chinese. He clarifies, “most Chinese still view international affairs through the lens of what benefits the national interest, rather than believing that China has any special responsibility for the global order” (Pang et al. 2006, 1). As part of their internally focused view, he relays that China is focused on dealing with regional problems bilaterally with her neighbors and to suggest she is the second superpower is “premature.” Further, the domestic economic expansion has widened the gap between the haves and have-nots exacerbating already tense social cohesion issues.

Of note, is Ms. Susan Craig’s 2007 monograph, “Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats” wherein she discusses how China

perceives itself, especially the views of the influential elite (Craig 2007, 1-172). They are a proud country with a long history of survival. China views this time of immense economic growth as a window of strategic opportunity to maintain social transformation and negate threats to peace and stability. She notes that, China has a “unifying consciousness” dedicated to “maintaining the unity of the country and its territorial integrity and sovereignty” as briefed by Lieutenant General Li who was visiting the US Army War College (Craig 2007, 7).

Pang observes that China’s role in the international environment is greatly influenced by the Sino-American relationship. It must be perceived as strong, relevant, and as a “firm force safeguarding world peace, not a force challenging world peace” (Pang 2002). Of interest, he notes that no country can guarantee its security alone in the globalized world. He suggests that as states become interdependent, the risk to their security actually rises because it trades what it can provide for itself for what it can get from another state leading to a potential “security deficit.” Therefore, China must wrestle with the deficit and who is to “fill the gap.” It is obvious then that the military must modernize (since its size is actually shrinking) to protect the homeland and look beyond its borders to influence regional states into a security cooperation framework (Pang 2002). However, if America is the world’s superpower, why would China not want some form of a cooperation framework with the superpower to secure its own sovereignty especially since America’s greatest export industry is the “security industry?” Pang uses America’s security pact with NATO as an example of how the US is protecting the EU and how Japan purchased their security via the Japan-US Security Treaty. In this way, other nations have tried to fill their “security deficit.” He also cites that by default China

already benefits from the superpower's presence in Asia by acting as a containment or stability force versus Japan and North Korea. In the end, he encourages his countrymen to consider embracing the US as it actually strengthens China. Economic growth alone will not secure their future.

Again, in Susan Craig's Monograph on Chinese perceptions of security threats, she found:

Because China is so exceptional, its influential elite believe its rise will be unlike that of any other country in history. China will be able to develop without resorting to violence or conflict for two reasons. First, it does not seek hegemony like other rising powers, or to challenge the current international system. Ye Zicheng, Director for Chinese Strategic Studies at Beijing University, made this distinction: "The biggest difference between the now ascendant China on the one hand, and Germany during World War I and Japan during World War II on the other, is that China has no intent to challenge the existing international system through military expansion. Nor does it seek to create another international system outside the existing system to engage in confrontation." Second, China's rise can occur peacefully because of the globalized economy and China's importance within it. Ye continued, "It was necessary for the powers of the past to resort to military force because they could not achieve the goal of development using peaceful means. Previously, markets and resources were divvied up. The only way to capture them was to use force. Today, even though there are conflicts between China and the powers in the allocation of markets and resources, they can be worked out peacefully." (Craig 2007, 10-11)

Recently, after the December 2007 Strategic Economic Dialogue, the US Treasury Secretary, Mr. Henry Paulson stated, "We also both recognize the need to fight economic nationalism in our two nations." The Strategic Economic Dialogue was established by Presidents Hu and Bush to provide an overarching bilateral economic framework to maintain strong and mutually beneficial US-China economic relations. President Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao after meeting with Mr. Paulson were quoted as saying, "frictions and problems that have occurred in the process of economic cooperation are natural . . . compared with the huge benefits we have gained from this

business relationship, they [these problems] are less important” (Associated Press 2007).

This dialogue is indicative of how the Chinese view relationships. Essentially seeking harmony, overarching goals, and not sweating the details are basic parameters to their world view approach.

Mr. Kenneth Lieberthal, former senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council in the Clinton administration and now a professor of political science and business administration at the University of Michigan, observes, “the Chinese are generally committed to the notion that you get more by taking more time, taking things more gradually, and using more carrots and fewer sticks, because ultimately you need national leaders in the countries you’re trying to change, you need national leaders to be able to make the changes you want them to make without losing face. In other words, it’s got to be politically feasible for them domestically to go there” (Public Broadcast System 2006a). He further develops his view of the US-China relationship that generally the US and China agree on many shared goals, they just differ on how to go about achieving those goals.

It is important as one looks at world views to continually assess if we are truly looking at them from the other’s point of view. It is hard to look at current situations and seek a holistic view if not all parties were involved in making the decision. China has to grapple with being a world leader and in doing so, takes on all the good and ill of that responsibility regardless of whether they had a hand in creating the environment. Additionally, other nations, specifically the US have to step-back and realize there is a new partner who does have a legitimate, valid, and different view. In reflecting on President Hu’s April 2006 visit to the US, Lim states, “China does have its own interests,

including its own economic interests, including its own diplomatic interests, and it's naive to expect it to just follow US policy just because it's a friend; we need to see things very much more from the Chinese point of view, an evolving point of view" (Public Broadcast System 2006b). Lim holds a PhD and is a Professor of Strategy and International Business at the University of Michigan Business School. She continues that if China is to be treated as an equal, a leader who is expected to deliver results, then it must be allowed to assist in crafting policy not limited to just executing policy.

For the US perspective, Mr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., former member of the DOD's National Defense Panel and respected analyst of military affairs and strategic planning, writes about challenges to the newly published 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Krepinevich 2006, 55-58). One of the three challenges outlined is China. He acknowledges there are two opposing views of how to handle China (either a threat or a state to be engaged economically in the international community). The US approach to China should be somewhere in-between threat and engagement. For the engagement perspective, Mr. Krepinevich cautions that although China is a rising power, it is beset with many internal conflicts to include growing ecological challenges, societal instability, a growing dependence on foreign energy resources, and several outstanding security issues. All of these areas he highlights are potential friction points between the US and Chinese governments (Krepinevich 2006, 58).

Krepinevich does not see a conflict brewing and observes, "China is not wedded to an aggressive, expansionist ideology" (Krepinevich 2006, 58). However, he does discuss China's desire to be the principal regional power, a move that would be more acceptable to the international community if it were to occur over time via influence and

presence. If, on the other hand, hegemony were achieved through coercion, the US would not allow it to go unaddressed (Krepinevich 2006, 58). He concludes with recommendations of how to adjust the DOD's strategy to allow cooperation in areas where the US and China have common interests, dissuading China from acting unilaterally to solve geopolitical problems, and suggests the military prepare to reinforce this strategy through asymmetrical means.

In January 2007, the Congressional Research Service authored a report for Congress, *China's Trade with the US and the World*, wherein they develop the idea of engagement more fully in how capitalizing on globalization and fostering economic prosperity in China serves broader US national interests. The Congressional Research Service states trade is but one part of the US overall strategy of engagement with China. It is also necessary to work with China through economic, diplomatic, informational, and military interchanges. "Engagement achieves important national security goals such as preventing nuclear proliferation, defeating global terrorism, defusing regional conflicts, fostering global economic growth, and championing aspirations for human dignity. These goals are aimed at achieving U.S. national interests of security and prosperity for all Americans and projecting U.S. values abroad" (Lum and Nanto 2007, 2).

This "external" world view is at times at odds with how China sees their role in global affairs. Specifically, as Pang, Krepinevich, and *China's National Defense in 2006* suggests, China does not seek to expand an ideology, but to continue to unify their country and preserve their 5,000 years of proud history long into the future. However, some of the risks inherent in the policy of engagement are: creating centers of power outside the CCP due to a foreign dependence on resources; increasing pressure for

democratic reform; CCP's desire to maintain legitimacy; acknowledging and adjusting to China as an economic competitor who has an advantage in some sectors; and economic engagement with China results in strengthening the autocratic socialist government and Chinese military. These are risks for both China and the US that will weigh into what decisions are made and how willing the countries are to negotiate. Whatever the strategy the US develops with China a defining message of the report is, "a country as significant as China--accounting for a quarter of the world's population, armed with nuclear weapons, and a member of the U.N. Security Council--cannot be ignored or isolated" (Lum and Nanto 2007, 2).

Taiwan's Independence

On Taiwan, President Hu has made it clear that, "Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and China will continue to make every effort and endeavor with sincerity to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification of the two sides across the Taiwan Straits . . . however, we will never allow anyone to make Taiwan secede from China by any means" (Xinhua News Agency 2006). His assertion is reinforced in *China's National Defense in 2006* wherein upholding the national security and unity of China includes safeguarding against separatist forces for Taiwan Independence (PRC 2006, 4). President Bush's 2006 NSS outlines in Section VIII "Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power" that "China and Taiwan must also resolve their differences peacefully, without coercion and without unilateral action by either China or Taiwan" (U.S. President 2006, 42). Further, President Bush has personally reassured President Hu that he will uphold the one-China policy, abide by the three Sino-US joint communiqués, and oppose "Taiwan independence" (Xinhua News

Agency 2006). However, the US has continued to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, host Taiwanese officers in their schools, and conduct government and military exchanges under the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8 (1979). This aggravates China who calls into question the US' sincerity in complying with the three communiqués (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, 5).

Energy and Natural Resources

The third friction point this paper will focus on is the effort by both China and the US to seek continued access to or develop partnerships to guarantee new access to natural resources. Again, the US NSS and *China's National Defense in 2006* highlight the national interest of both parties to retain access to foreign or world resources in order to provide for their people and secure their future as a growing economy. Access to resources is a vital interest of both countries and the denial of resources could be considered a threat to their national security. China has immense growth and the effects of globalization on its people, economy, and ecological system demand they look to diversify and import resources. This effort has been labeled by some as the “charm offensive” as China seeks out new partnerships to satisfy her nation’s voracious appetite for petroleum, steel, coal, and natural gas.

The US NSS and *China's National Defense in 2006* both address the need for a stable international environment so that fair trade practices can flourish to allow the security of the nation by assuring access to natural resources abroad. Both documents clearly state these objectives as critical to national security and therefore foremost in ensuring internal, regional, and international stability. However, they differ in their

approach, and therefore, represent areas for friction to develop as the US and China court access to natural resources.

Peter Brookes, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation who currently serves as a Commissioner on the congressionally-mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and served in the George W. Bush administration as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, wrote in the *Heritage Foundation* in April 2006 about China's African ambitions. In the article, he decries that if gone unchecked, "China's broad energy, trade, political, diplomatic, and military interests threaten to undermine long-standing efforts to promote peace, prosperity, and democracy in Africa" (Brookes 2006). He supports his argument by citing China's inroads into the Sudan and Zimbabwe wherein China has not only provided financial incentives and infrastructure support but has also provided weapons to support the governments that many view are corrupt, known for human rights abuses, and suppresses the political freedoms of their people. Despite UN embargoes and calls for further sanctions, the PRC has blocked these efforts. When the Chinese Ambassador to the US was asked about Beijing's policy in Africa, he stated, "Business is business. The problems of the [African nations] are internal affairs . . . and we are not in a position to impose upon them" (Brookes 2006). Finally, he notes that many of the authoritarian African regimes find China's modernization approach more appealing than the West who demands free-market economies and democratic reforms which he states may aggravate or derail the US efforts to transform Africa into a continent with stability, viable markets, and free from terrorist influences.

Ms. Susan Puska cautions against fear mongering with respect to China's increased presence in Africa. Puska is a retired Army Colonel who served as a US Army attaché in Beijing and now works with the Defense Group in Washington, DC. In the *Asia Times*, Puska discusses the increased presence of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Africa and how China is using that presence to protect their investment and also to grow multi and bilateral military exchanges, partnerships, and cooperative agreements (Puska 2007). Although the growing presence is of interest, the real concern is China's intent in the region and how those intentions may or may not mesh with other international forces stationed or deployed there. She also touches on the concern about China's willingness to prop up governments for China's own self-interest no matter how despicable the practices of those governments may be. Her caution is for the US to not build a confrontational response to the PLA's presence in Africa and reminds that there is plenty of work to be done in Africa and the US should focus her efforts to press China on their actions with African governments in order to foster stability, trade, and prosperity for the region.

The last article pertinent to friction points found in the pursuit of natural resources is in the fall 2007 *Joint Force Quarterly Journal* wherein Philippe Rogers writes about ways to counter the Chinese influence in Africa (Roger 2007, 22-27). Lieutenant Colonel Rogers currently works at the Marine Corps Special Operations Command and provides suggestions on how to expand the current US strategy into a more comprehensive approach and highlights areas where China is not currently engaged or where the US has preeminence. In so doing, he points out, "as Beijing continues to expand operations in Africa, the likelihood of Chinese and American policies clashing will increase, possibly

forcing underlying tensions into open conflict” (Roger 2007, 25). The underlying tensions are rooted in the strategies of the two nations. He notes China’s national objectives are economic expansion, international prestige, a unified China, and domestic stability while the US objectives are to promote good governance, market reform, regional security, and stability for the African continent. Although these aims may seem congruent, he outlines how China’s practices actually undermine the US’ goals and the goals of the international community. China’s behavior and how African leaders respond to China “stymie US efforts, leading to friction, if not outright conflict, between Beijing and Washington” (Roger 2007, 22). He colors China’s actions in Africa as an “opportunistic creation of strategic counterbalances designed to increase its influence and limit that of the United States” (Roger 2007, 23). And, while China’s national objectives are being met in the short term, longer-term problems arise by China undermining international efforts to force African leaders to end genocide, corruption, and transform their countries into stable governments with prosperous economies and secure from transnational terrorism and human trafficking. The article concludes with recommendations to change US policy by using all instruments of national power to invigorate the US government’s strategy with Africa, gain or maintain the lead in some areas, and in others check or negate China’s lead all in an effort to avoid conflict in the future.

Cyberspace

The cyber domain is of strategic importance for world trade and banking, communication, national security, international relations, and exchange of information and represents the fourth area of friction. “Super-empowered people” place at risk this

strategic and international asset (Friedman 2000). Attacks on the US have been attributed to China or addresses within China and, when questioned, China has offered vague explanations as to why some of the attacks have happened. This new and growing offensive capability is discussed in depth by various US authors (see for example, *Dragon Bytes, Decoding the Virtual Dragon, and Cyber Silhouettes* by Mr. Tim Thomas of the US Army's Foreign Military Studies Office [FMSO]). These works detail the capability, strategy, depth of, and possible intent of the threat of information warfare by the Chinese. Alarmingly, they are a near-peer with this capability vis-à-vis the US, and the US is grappling with how to respond initially and how to grow in capacity to meet this challenge.

Meanwhile, espionage of Department of Defense (DOD) computers, denial of system and network access, and loss of data remain key areas that the US cites as challenges to its national interests by China. It is of such importance that the US has begun to build a cyber force of trained personnel and designing platforms to defend from and attack in the cyber domain. Cyber is of such strategic importance, the U.S. Air Force added cyberspace to its mission statement in 2005 and established a new Major Command in 2008 (U.S. Air Force 2008). All vulnerabilities that threaten the information sovereignty of a nation may now be viewed as a reason to act offensively or defensively to protect their economy, navigation systems, information grid, government operations, social cohesion for national unity, and ultimately, their sovereignty.

Mr. John Tkacik, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, wrote in a December 2007 article about the current and increasing threat of cyber attack from Chinese hackers and provides evidence of state sponsored

attacks. The article cautions the current administration to heed known warning signs and not wait to act against China's cyber warriors. He discusses the threat both in terms of intelligence collection (cyber spies) and the demonstrated offensive capabilities (denial or disruption of services). The article espouses the largest threat to the US is to the nation's information infrastructure and a threat also exists to the commercial, financial, and energy sectors. He cites evidence of recent attacks to support his discussion, specifically, attacks on the DOD, State Department, Department of Homeland Security, Commerce Department, and sensitive networks in the academic, industrial, and finance sectors. Finally, Tkacik supports his argument that the threat from China is an international one by citing Great Britain, German, and French officials who all state their own concerns of cyber attacks and China's capability to conduct offensive operations with effects on par with those from a weapon of mass destruction (Tkacik 2007).

Recently online East-Asia-Intel.Com published an article discussing China's PLA strategy for conducting computer network attack and how the attack and defense need to be integrated into the larger "high-tech" warfare strategy (East-Asia-Intel.com 2008). This ties into *China's National Defense in 2006* wherein reaching "the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century" is discussed (PRC 2006, 4). The US acknowledges the value of controlling or having freedom of movement within the cyberspace domain and recognizes, "Today, China's ability to sustain military power at a distance is limited. However, as the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* notes, 'China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military

technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages”” (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, I).

Of note, at least one Chinese expert in the cyber realm realizes the dangers of polluting the cyber environment. As introduced earlier, Gao provides five principles to cooperate in and optimize cyberspace. Those principles are: Maintaining safe Internet operation; Respecting diverse cultures; Protecting the young; Providing useful information; and Restraining harmful information. He develops each of these areas, which are essentially efforts to engage the international community with China to protect this humankind asset. He concludes the article by mentioning current cooperation efforts like the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding on the “Establishment of a Coordination Mechanism for Online Copyright Protection,” the 2007 Beijing Declaration to enhance exchanges, communication, and agreement on domain name administration, and the 2007 “International Conference on Cyber Crime” held in New Delhi to increase capacity of cyber-police to prevent and combat Internet crime (Gao 2007). In addition, he notes the growth of FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams), an organization comprising of 180 members spread over Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania that work together voluntarily to deal with computer security problems and their prevention (FIRST.org 2007).

Gao believes the Internet is the “commonwealth of humankind and international society is under serious obligation to cooperate in safeguarding it” (Gao 2007). Further, he acknowledges US and China interdependence in cyber and recommends these two countries shoulder the responsibility to protect their investment and ensure a safe cyber environment.

Space

In looking into the last point of friction, both *China's National Defense in 2006* and the US report on *The Military Power of the PRC* illustrate the sensitivity of the domain of space. The intrinsic value of space as a means for commerce, communication, navigation, and command and control are evident; additionally, space may be used by an adversary to deny the aspects above or it may be used to strike one's adversaries. Both reports demonstrate the strategic value understood by the US and China and also demonstrate a genuine concern of either country using space to deny or harm the other's sovereignty.

In addition, the *Joint Force Quarterly* published an essay by US Navy Commander Gregory Metzler in October 2007 detailing China's space capabilities and possible implications for US Military Strategy. The essay won the Strategic Article category of the 2007 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. The essay briefly highlights the effects of China's January 2007 launch of an antisatellite weapon and successful interdiction of its own low Earth orbit satellite. The article suggests China's success in space is a reflection of the economic growth and desire to energize its technological and industrial centers. Further, China's space program offers diplomatic and military benefits to China's overall strategic power. He cites the use of the space program to share intelligence, weather data, and other resource data with partners or as a way to broker new partnerships. The military benefits are not only ones of direct military presence and power for offensive strategies but also indirect power to leverage negotiations with the West beneficial to China. Finally, he discusses ways in which China can be engaged in order to maintain space as a peaceful endeavor benefiting all the

nations of the Earth and ways to survive an attack of space or space assets for US forces (Metzler 2007, 96-98).

Understanding Intentions

Part of the equation for avoiding conflict is to not only understand areas of friction but to also make an assessment of the intended endstate of a nation's actions. So, what is the intended endstate of China's military, economic, and diplomatic expansion, and how does the US influence that endstate?

An overarching statement of China's endstate is found in *China's National Defense in 2006* wherein, "China is committed to building a moderately prosperous society in an all-around way and a socialist harmonious society, and it enjoys steady economic growth, political stability, ethnic harmony, and social progress" (PRC 2006, 3). Pang, Krepinevich, and *China's National Defense in 2006* suggest China does not seek to expand an ideology, but to continue to unify their country and preserve their 5,000 years of proud history long into the future. However, some of the risks inherent in a policy of engaging China are: creating centers of power outside the CCP in light of foreign dependence on resources, increasing pressures for democratic reform, challenging CCP's desire to maintain legitimacy, acknowledging and adjusting to China as an economic competitor who has an advantage in some sectors, and engaging economically with a government that may result in both the socialist government and Chinese military. These are risks for both China and the US that will weigh into what decisions are made and how willing the countries are to negotiate.

Recently, in Defense News, Mr. Wendell Minnick wrote about China's military charm offensive and pondered whether the offensive was sinister or benign (Minnick

2008). In the article, Minnick interviews Bernard Cole, an expert on China's Navy, who sees China in a darker light. Cole states, "Beijing aspires to be in a position where it can effectively-through economic and diplomatic pressure . . . direct the course of events in the region that affect Chinese interests . . . and the US reaction should be based on policies that strengthen our position and not [engage in] China-bashing" (Minnick 2008). Cole and two other analysts (one Singaporean and one British) express concern over the US' apparent distraction with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). If the Pacific is left unwatched, China may make inroads into nations the US and her Southeast Asian allies may otherwise not be comfortable with. He suggests "the US increase its representation at ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] meetings and ensure a presence and role proportional to its still-No.1 economy and military force in the region" (Minnick 2008).

However, Bonnie Glaser, a senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International studies, counters in the same article that, "there is no convincing evidence China is seeking to push the US out of the region or change the international system or the regional rules of the game. On the contrary, the Chinese see many benefits from the prevailing arrangements" (Minnick 2008).

As far as China's military expansion, the PLA fields a military force to defend their interests like all countries. With expanding economic interests beyond their borders, it would seem prudent for China to expand their military to protect this growing interest. China espouses its military is defensive in nature and serves only to secure China's security, unity, and ensure the interests of national development (PRC 2006, 3). Currently, China's military is transforming, updating its weaponry, doctrine, logistics,

leaning out its frontline combat force, expanding its high-tech capabilities (direct energy, cyber, space, information), and strengthening its reserve forces. *China's National Defense in 2006* claims these initiatives tie into larger national strategic objectives to mobilize the economy and balance the needs of the military with the needs of civil society (PRC 2006, 22).

However, not all analysts are convinced that the claims in *China's National Defense in 2006* are the full story. Specifically, the PLA's limited war under high tech conditions has a number of "Chinese characteristics" that Major Mark Stokes, USAF, talks about in his work, *China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States*. Major Stokes was the assistant air attaché in Beijing from 1992 to 1995 and his work focuses on the revolution in military affairs that has occurred in China.

Writing in 1999, he warned that the PLA can "gain information dominance in future armed conflicts" and that "dominance would be further boosted by China's traditional emphasis on information denial and deception" (Stokes 1999, v, 8-9). He documents how China's military doctrine is changing to an offensive nature and reflects that, "if war against a technologically superior power breaks out, an enemy will likely deploy forces rapidly and then launch a massive air campaign; and that while an enemy is amassing forces, a window of opportunity exists for a preemptive strike" (Stokes 1999, 8). And, more clearly, China's doctrinal writings state:

Gaining the initiative by striking first (*xianfa zhiren*), is an effective means to offset technological and logistical advantages which a more advanced military power brings to the fight marking a significant change from the previous principle of "gaining mastery only after the enemy has struck" (*houfa zhirne*). . . . This does not require annihilation of the enemy or occupation of his territory, only a paralyzing "mortal blow" (*zhiming daji*), "winning victory with one strike" (*yizhan, ersheng*). (Stokes 1999, 9)

More insight into why China has and continues to expand her military's capability is found in General Liu Jingsong's "Views on the Trends and Strategy of Military Development in the Current World" which appeared in the June 1999 *China Military Science Quarterly* (Liu 1999, 1-19). General Liu served as the president of the Academy of Military Sciences in Beijing (1997 to 1999) and his article provides a comprehensive analysis of the world's major military's strategic adjustments and recommends changes to China's force construction policy and strategy. Although written in 1999, the article is insightful because it appears that many of the recommendations he suggested have been adopted by the PLA.

General Liu discusses the campaigns in Grenada, Libya, Panama, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq (Desert Shield and Storm) and the strategic adjustments made by the Western European Union, NATO, Russia, US, Great Britain, India, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations country's military affairs. His overall recommendation is for China to have a smaller force, of high quality, greater efficiency and able to conduct limited war under high tech conditions in lieu of the large strategic force prepared for mass land battles. He notes the world's powers seek strategic adjustments that are self-initiated, comprehensive, flexible, and forward-looking. With regard to flexibility, he notes, "flexibility of strategy emphasizes preparing to win wars while seeking to deter them, on the comprehensive employment of political, diplomatic, and economic means to ease tension, or the employment of military means to intervene, before a crisis takes shape or when it is still at a budding stage" (Liu 1999, 6). However, no one can be assured there will not be conflict so he recommends China prepare for warfare in the 21st century.

Drawing on Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin's guidance and perceptions, Liu states warfare in the 21st century will mainly be focused on limited, local, and high tech war. He finds twelve characteristics to be critical for victory and all can be seen in China's military transformation. The characteristics are listed as: (1) limited political objectives keeping the war under control in light of peaceful development, a global economy, and high tech weapons offering lower risk and higher efficiency and greater transparency in operations; (2) hi-tech weapons; (3) information and informationized equipment having the widest impact on the form of warfare may be the determining factor in victory; (4) reconnaissance, precision guided weapons, and over the horizon strikes; (5) the battlefield is a multi-dimensional space composed of ground, sea, air, space, and electronics with the lines between front, rear, offense, and defense blurred; (6) strategic and tactical missiles make warfare a fluid and interlocking non-linear battlefield; (7) increased emphasis on the quality and art of command and control; (8) war is faster, shorter, and the first battle may be the decisive battle; (9) combat actions around the clock not hindered by weather or night; (10) preparation time for war is expanded due to warfare complexity; (11) integrated joint operations; and (12) electronic soft kills and firepower hard kills linked together as part of a joint operation or independent action (Liu 1999, 8-13).

Liu elaborates on the strategic and tactical importance of informationized warfare and stresses the value of this aspect cannot be overstated. Informationized warfare transforms all platforms, weapons, electronic warfare, and command and control systems and digitizes the personal equipment of the soldier on a digitized battlefield. He states that, "automation is the adhesive of all types of weapons and the multiplier of the various

combat forces” (Liu 1999, 15). The impact of this transformation affects not only a nation’s power to act offensively but also complicates its ability to continue to operate or defend from informationized warfare. The cyber attacks referred to earlier in friction points and the volumes of writing by Chinese theorists and tacticians reveal that China’s main focus in the future will be to dominate this realm. Finally, Liu recommends changes to weapon technologies, force organization, force structure, military command network, education and training, use of simulators, and a push to continue to evolve their military theory in order to be prepared for warfare in the 21st Century. In looking at the changes China has made since 1999, it would appear all, if not most, of these recommendations have been adopted.

In addition to General Liu’s 1999 article, recently Major General Ma Ping wrote for *China Military Science*, “National Interests and Military Security.” General Ma’s article compliments General Liu’s insights and brings them forward into the current operational context. Major General Ma was the Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Department at the PLA’s National Defense University in Beijing. This article provides a great overview of national interests and offers insights into the importance of leveraging social, diplomatic, informational, and military powers to secure national interests (Ma 2005, 1-23).

Ma realizes that President Hu Jintao has focused national interests as a whole on development but also looks to advance the military’s role in the protection and realization of national interests (Ma 2005, 13). In this period of important strategic opportunity, China is also faced with severe challenges, some of which are in the military security field. For this field, he reinforces General Liu’s recommendations by encouraging the

acceleration of informationized warfare, keeping abreast of international military transformation, and “strengthening our ability to respond to crisis, preserve peace, contain war, and win wars” (Ma 2005, 13).

Finally, Evan Medeiros and Taylor Fravel’s 2003 article on “China’s New Diplomacy” rounds out research on trying to answer, what is China’s intended endstate of her military, economic, and diplomatic expansion and how does the US influence that endstate? In their Foreign Affairs article, they conclude China’s rise is not only strategically important for China but also for the US (Medeiros and Fravel 2003, 22-35). “China’s increased participation in international institutions . . . offers a new means with which to influence the country’s perceptions and the pursuit of its interests and creates leverage for other states who participate in these organizations” (Medeiros and Fravel 2003, 35). Further, China will focus on national development and, primarily, internal domestic problems as they seek to capitalize on this strategic opportunity to develop their country. Finally, they suggest, US policymakers use the same opportunity to address the challenges and opportunities created by China’s rise (Medeiros and Fravel 2003, 35).

However China evolves, what exactly their desired endstate is, and to what extent their desired endstate is achieved, the US has to develop a strategy in line with her own interests and one that is aware of China’s intentions (stated or hidden). As a result, the US assesses China’s military as the lead challenger to US capabilities especially for a high-intensity, short duration, high-tech war (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, I). Whatever strategy the US develops with respect to China, a foundational premise for that strategy should be, “a country as significant as China--accounting for a quarter of the

world's population, armed with nuclear weapons, and a member of the UN Security Council--cannot be ignored or isolated" (Lum and Nanto 2007, 2).

Strategy

Strategy as defined by the DOD is, "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives" (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, GL-29). In this context, strategy is the employment of the instruments (elements) of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives. The formulation of US strategy is generally considered, at least in military circles, to follow the Arthur Lykke strategy model. This model relies on the ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources) a nation state uses to wield the instruments of power to achieve political objectives of the state and relates them to the legs of a stool that must be balanced versus risk (Lykke 1993, 3-8). The instruments of national power are found in the DIME construct.

The "D" in DIME stands for diplomatic means as an instrument of national power. This includes diplomatic engagement, alliances, treaties, international organizations, agreements, academic exchange programs, engineering and technology exchange, and communiqués. Informational capabilities is the "I" in DIME and covers the gamut from strategic communication designed for government to government influence to local and national media reporting the opinions and outlook of a nation. It also includes the mechanisms that create and disseminate the informational instrument of national power (computers, televisions, newspaper, networks, and the global grid). "M" is

the military instrument of national power and represents all offensive and defensive capabilities a nation can bring to bear on an opponent or in support of an ally. This includes military training, technology sales or transfers, senior leader engagement, education exchange programs, and exercises. Finally, economics is the last instrument in the DIME construct and encompasses trade, employment, currency, investment, divestment, embargoes, and debt forgiveness. The DIME is not all encompassing but generally considered the primary ways a nation can exert influence and when all four are synchronized, the result is a true expression of comprehensive national power.

The Lykke model provides a hierarchical structure wherein a nation describes its national interests in a *NSS*, a *National Military Strategy* enforces the *NSS*, and a theater strategy carries out the *National Military Strategy*. This structure represents a span of control subordinating the military strategy to the national strategy (figure 1). Additionally, every other governmental department writes a supporting strategy to execute the overall *NSS*.




Figure 1. US Strategy Formulation Model

Source: J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., *US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, 2nd ed. (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006), 387.

Some argue there is no clearly defined formulation for strategy in the US. Mr. Richard Yarger in, *Towards a Theory of Strategy* (2000), concedes that although there is little evidence of a clearly defined national consensus for strategy formulation, he finds that the strategy formula developed by Lykke to be the closest the US has as a commonly understood model and overtime it has proven relevant and adaptable (Yarger 2000, 6). Yarger's article is a reflection of a *Washington Quarterly* article (1990) written by Mr. Gregory D. Foster who alleges there is no official theory of strategy in the US and in fact,

the culture of Americans lends the practice of theorizing as a “futile intellectual exercise” (Yarger 2000, 1). Foster is currently a Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, DC, and Yarger is a Professor at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Yarger also drafted “The US Army War College Methodology for Determining Interests and Levels of Intensity” (1997) wherein the major steps towards developing a methodology are outlined to create an effective national security strategy and supporting strategies from all elements of national power (Yarger and Barber 1997, 118-125).

A final article about Lykke’s strategy model was written by Kristan Wheaton and Diane Chido comparing Lykke’s model to business for corporate strategy development and discusses how terms are critical and must be defined. Specifically, their article addresses confusion in formulating strategy because there is no clearly defined definition of the key terms “strategy” and “strategic” (Wheaton and Chido 2007, 44-45). They offer that Lykke’s model provides some clarity with these terms, a model, and how to apply that model. They suggest the model is not only relevant to national security matters but also translates into civilian matters for corporate strategy that can be used in international business practice.

China, on the other hand, has long viewed its ability to shape its objectives from a comprehensive perspective. The Chinese view national interests as, “the cardinal basis to determine the alignment of a state’s military strategy as well as the starting point and also the destination of its national military strategic guidance” (Peng and Yao 2005, 39). Chinese military theorists mostly rely on Mao Zedong’s definition of strategy and largely consider strategy to be related to war and war only (Peng and Yao 2005, 9). Mao referred

to strategy as, “the study of the laws of a war situation as a whole” and that understanding “overall planning instead of making a particular response to some local question” is central to Mao’s comprehensive scientific definition of strategy (Peng and Yao 2005, 9-10). Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi have edited the first English translation of *The Science of Military Strategy* (2005) as published by the Academy of Military Science. This 500-page work describes in detail the manner by which the Chinese have developed their concept of military strategy, military strategy formulation, and how the military strategy drives all other national forms of power into a comprehensive projection of overall national power. Strategy is designed to answer the problem, “who takes what means in how large scope to gain what purpose?” Peng and Yao find China’s national military strategy is summed up as:

Strategy (or military strategy) in China’s new periods is taking the national comprehensive power as its foundation, the thought of active defense as its guidance; and winning local war under high-tech conditions as its basic point to construct and exercise military strength; and carrying out the overall and whole-course operation and guidance of war preparations and war for the purpose of protecting national sovereignty and security. (Peng and Yao 2005, 12-13)

According to Mr. David Finkelstein, China does not have a single document equating to the US NSS but, instead, have a similar mechanism to the US *National Military Strategy* called Military Strategic Guidelines (*junshi zhanliue fangzhen*). Finkelstein has authored several works about China’s military strategy and in September 2007 wrote a document for the Strategic Studies Institute titled, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’” (Finkelstein 2007, 69-140). He observes that the five successive PRC Defense Papers and the Guidelines constitute more insight into China’s strategy than any other documents.

The Guidelines are not issued very often and “according to a senior PLA strategist, prior to 1993, this has happened only four times since the founding of the PRC in 1949” (Finkelstein 2007, 82). Finkelstein’s overview of China’s strategy states that “the strategic guiding thought that is the ‘core’ of the Military Strategic Guidelines forms the basis for fleshing out the details of the ‘ends, ways, and means’ of the PRC’s national military strategy, and major changes to it can have far-reaching programmatic and operational planning implications for the PLA” (Finkelstein 2007, 84). Adjustments to the Military Strategic Guidelines also address domestic and non-defense related issues because China does not generate a national security strategy like the US. However, Finkelstein’s analysis seems to force a US output (ends, ways, means) from a different thought process.

Mr. Tim Thomas of the US Army’s FMSO discusses the “Chinese Military’s Strategic Mind-set” in the December 2007 *Military Review*. He compares China’s comprehensive approach to the US’ ends, ways, means approach defined by Lykke (Thomas 2007a, 47-55). He delineates that for China, the word “strategy” as a military term carries thousands of years of tradition, culture, and a deep understanding of the importance of the theory of strategy and its effective application (Thomas 2007a, 47). His analysis compares and contrasts the methods these two nations use to develop strategy and therein highlights flaws with the US’ methodology. He notes the comprehensive nature of the Chinese view of strategy wherein strategists must consider national interests, war strength, and an opposing force’s war potential (Thomas 2007a, 49). Further, he found solely Chinese characteristics of strategy in their use of stratagems (deception) and the use of objective (space and time) and subjective (creativity and

initiative) factors when developing strategy. Relying heavily on *The Science of Military Strategy* and Lykke's methodology to make his comparisons, Thomas encourages US strategists to consider the Chinese view of strategy versus our own and challenges that the US has much to learn in the way of strategic thinking (Thomas 2007a, 55). Figure 2 is Thomas' graphical depiction of China's hierarchical and comprehensive science of strategy from a Chinese perspective.




Figure 2. China's Science of Strategy Model

Source: Timothy L. Thomas, "Chinese Military's Strategic Mind-set," *Military Review* (November-December 2007): 51.

So, what is the US strategy vis-à-vis China, and what is China's current strategy vis-à-vis the US? With respect to US strategy towards China, there is specific mention of China and the region in the NSS and the State Department's Strategic Plan, but that is where US strategy toward China stops from a national perspective. US Pacific Command (USPACOM) has a strategy for China that consists of engagement, deterrence, and standing war plans if deterrence fails. Admiral Fallon, while Commander of USPACOM, found engagement with deterrence as key assets in working with China. In April 2008 during an interview with Thomas Barnett for *Esquire* magazine, Admiral Fallon stated, "China is our most important relationship for the future . . . an emphasis on opening new lines of communication and reducing the capacity for misunderstanding during times of crisis" are essential; and, towards China, "if you want to be a big boy and a major player, you've got to act like it" (Barnett 2008, 151).

However China fully communicates its strategy to the CCP and the PLA, it is clear the Guidelines and Defense Papers address "What kinds of conflicts must the PLA be prepared to fight?" and "How should PLA modernization and reform programs adjust to comport with the new operational imperatives?" like the US NSS and *National Military Strategy* (Finkelstein 2007, 86). In answering these questions, one finds how China plans to interact with or counter the US as mentioned in *China's National Defense in 2006*, General Ma's and General Liu's articles. China recognizes the superiority of the US force in capability, technology, and logistics. Therefore, China envisions an asymmetric high-tech war under local conditions characterized by an informationized war as key to their success in securing their interests' vis-à-vis the US.

As these countries traverse the geopolitical landscape, their actions demonstrate a desire and ability to utilize all instruments of national power. Specifically, the US and China engage in military-to-military senior leader conferences between USPACOM and DOD officials with the PLA, regional exercises, doctrinal exchanges, and both participate with mutually beneficial UN peacekeeping missions. On the diplomatic and informational fronts, they utilize diplomacy, information exchange, negotiation, and crisis control methods as they work on pandemic disease, natural disasters, human rights, North Korean nuclear disarmament, and transnational terrorism. High-level ambassadorial meetings, exchanges, international organization memberships, and partnerships continue to keep these two nations in dialogue. Economically, these two powerhouses cooperate to the benefit of not only their nation's economies but also the global economy. In December 2007, President Hu Jintao addressed the Third Strategic Economic Dialogue headed by U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. President Hu's reflections were:

The dialogue, together with other mechanisms, has become an important occasion for enhancing mutual strategic trust and practical cooperation. China was willing to work with the US, from a strategic and long-term view, to further cooperation in international and regional issues. We need to respect and address major mutual concerns, consistently broaden mutual interests, and achieve new development in the constructive and cooperative relations between China and the U.S. in the New Year. (Xinhua News Agency 2007)

In addition, there is evidence of cooperation to share, use and develop natural resources. U.S. Energy Secretary, Mr. Samuel Bodman noted during his address to the 2007 George H. W. Bush China-US Relations Conference that:

Our two countries have established a working framework for future cooperation, but there is still a lot left to discuss, both where energy issues are concerned and on environmental issues related to energy. I believe we are well on our way to the strategic partnership that, in my judgment, is in our best interests. But there is still

much to be done. We must find ways to work together to confront issues like resource nationalism, pollution, and market transparency. (Bodman 2007)

Management Options

As shown in the two methodologies above, strategy includes several methods or ways to achieve an intended endstate based on a host of factors. How effectively these ways are employed is influenced by the operating environment, cultural awareness, intentions and actions by other states, and expertise in the arts of negotiation, deterrence, and crisis control. So, what options are available as effective means to influence relations with China in a way conducive to US interests in the region? The US has an initial strategy with stated goals and uses several methods to achieve those goals. These methods are diplomacy, engagement (political and military), informational, deterrence, crisis control, and war. However, when determining what methods may be more effective than others, it is important to ask, “what cultural aspects generate overriding principles in China’s and the US’ decision making about their national interests?” Even if you know an intended endstate, no one ever has full insight into an action; therefore, if one can understand why decision-makers make decisions, and what the key drivers are in their decision-making process, one can then better manage known friction points and more rapidly address those new or unexpected areas of friction.

At the basic human level, many western societies generally follow Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. However, this model does not fit for China’s collectivist society according to Drs. Patrick Gambrel and Rebecca Cianci. Their study “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: Does it Apply in a Collectivist Culture” concluded that the needs of a collectivist culture are “belonging, preserving harmony with their social environment, and to seek recognition for a job well-done as a group” wherein self-actualization is the

ultimate need in an individualistic society under Maslow's hierarchy (Gambrel and Cianci 2003, 158). They note that Chinese behavior is less spontaneous than the West and stresses hierarchy and centralized decision-making counter to those ideals advocated by US standards. Gambrel and Cianci also note that in a collectivist culture, avoiding confrontations and situations that would cause one to lose face will greatly increase one's communication and negotiating effectiveness (Gambrel and Cianci 2003, 159). This very basic difference in the two cultures should be taken into account when drafting policies, strategy, actions, and communication.

With frameworks (strategies) in place to cooperate and engage throughout the national government, integrating the instruments of national power and influence into one comprehensive national strategy is not an easy task. The RAND Corporation has a study underway entitled, "Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Strategy." This study began with a one-day conference in March 2006 and continued through 2007 looking to cull the "best practices" of Americans working abroad at the field level in an effort to study them for applicability to the senior level of US decision-making (Hunter and Nadiri 2007, 1-7).

The initial conference brought together twenty panelists with civil, private sector, military or non-governmental experience to scope the problem and then to meet throughout the year to produce a final publication. The conference highlighted a few areas that point to difficulty in effectively employing all instruments of national power. Specifically, the "complex challenges facing the US requires new forms of interaction among a variety of instruments for projecting power and promoting influence . . . requires

a clear, precise, and comprehensive direction from senior leadership in Washington” (Hunter and Nadiri 2007, 1).

Shaping the environment to prevent crisis or to quickly stabilize the environment after conflict has occurred demands a deliberate national and international effort consisting of government, civilian, private, multinational, and international actors. Poor cooperation within US agencies and departments as well as complex international relationships hamstrings efforts to avoid or resolve conflict. Personnel are usually poorly trained in skills required for this task as well as cultural biases within organizations that contribute dissonance in values, perspectives, and methods of deliberation (Hunter and Nadiri 2007, 2-3). A general lack of understanding or appreciation for foreign cultures and histories was cited as systemic.

Further, the panelists acknowledged that a rebalancing of effort between US government departments with requisite resources was one of the largest obstacles to an effective strategy. Finally, the panelists recommended the US be more willing to share decision-making and influence with foreign governments, militaries, multilateral and multinational organizations, and non-governmental organizations in return for the valuable counsel, expertise, legitimacy, and material support gained from these entities (Hunter and Nadiri 2007, 5). The study highlights the need for a common understanding or agreement on the approach to national security affairs and the need for more attention to a comprehensive approach to national power, much like the Chinese.

For the Chinese, General Ma’s article on *National Interests and Military Security* provides a great overview of national interests and offers insights into the importance of leveraging social, diplomatic, informational, and military powers to secure national

interests (Ma 2005, 1-23). He specifically addresses deterrence theory, engagement, and crisis control as cornerstone aspects of China's status as a major power. Nations have armies because conflict exists but the armies are not bound to military strength alone; whereby he calls deterrence, engagement and crisis control, "non-war" military actions (Ma 2005, 19). He notes, "military crisis management is a battle of wits and courage on the periphery of war; the clever and appropriate use of strategy can control the crisis satisfactorily and accomplish a heavy task easily, both defending one's own interests and prevent the crisis from spinning out of control and resulting in war" (Ma 2005, 20).

Maj Pak, US Army officer who recently taught Northeast Asia Politics at the US Military Academy, authored an article in the same *Military Review* as Thomas. His article focused on how China is using, and will continue to use, "soft power" in pursuit of its grand strategy (Pak 2007, 56-69). He defines soft power as the political and economic ability to influence outcomes via diplomacy and observes that in many ways China's soft power can "check" the US' hard power of military might. The article goes into depth on China's strategic goals, how they are going about achieving them, and how US actions provide friction and confusion in Asia. Maj Pak recommends a modification to US strategy in regards to China that will prevent China from gaining regional power supremacy in East Asia and also position the US to be the "power of choice" in the region thereby negating military coercion by China (Pak 2007, 68).

Other studies into the areas of engagement, deterrence, and crisis control are found in *The Science of Military Strategy*, RAND's *Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior*, Arthur Wilhelm's *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table*, Wu Xinbo's *Washington Quarterly* article "Understanding Chinese and US Crisis Behavior," and

Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress by Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel. All of these works provide insights into understanding the concepts of deterrence, engagement, and crisis control and more importantly, provide insight into how the US and China behaved in past events allowing one to better understand approaches for the future.

Dr. Arthur Wilhelm, Jr., who authored *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table* and served as a US Army attaché in Beijing, would probably agree that the cultural differences mentioned above would also play out in the verbal and non-verbal subtleties of communication. Americans typically want solutions and like the finality of decisions. However, Dr. Wilhelm observes differences in the Chinese style of negotiating. The “Chinese view diplomacy as a continuous bargaining process that periodically peaks in formal negotiations where progress is codified” (Wilhelm 1994, 215). He states that for the Chinese compromises over strategic objectives are much more difficult and the agreements that are achieved are usually conditional or temporary. The Chinese do not look for negotiations to solve a particular issue at hand but rather to confirm agreements already informally worked out and to set the stage or context for the next step in the strategic process (Wilhelm 1994, 216).

Dr. Wilhelm also found that although China sees the advantages of win-win propositions that the West likes to pursue, they also see danger in them. The danger lies in that one party has to sacrifice the initiative potentially leading to compromises of basic principles and that it gives a sovereign nation too much say in the affairs of another (Wilhelm 1994, 216). After interviewing many Chinese negotiators, he assembled five Chinese characteristics that “any negotiator should consider before entering into any

government-to-government negotiations: (1) The Chinese distrust international law, dependence on moral principles, and a legal system focused on criminal rather than civil law with respect to problems that transcend national boundaries; (2) The Chinese are most flexible during pre-negotiations before any public positions are taken--quiet diplomacy during this phase is the most effective way to approach the Chinese; (3) Third party communications are a successful means of warning a Chinese decision-maker before presenting him with a problem directly; (4) Frank discussions between negotiator counterparts about the possibilities of any disconnects are useful to avoid or quickly resolve cultural missteps (dress, eating habits, and others); (5) The Chinese often assert that demands be met before negotiations can be held or relations improve, however, they do not practice ‘all-or-nothing’ diplomacy so any steps in their direction are seen by them as an efficient process and follows their desired ‘step-by-step approach’” (Wilhelm 1994, 213).

In line with Dr. Wilhelm’s observations, Colonel Donald Get, US Army, describes the PLA’s negotiating tactics in his work, “What’s with the Relationship between America’s Army and China’s PLA.” He recommends training of all those who would deal or communicate with Chinese officials so that the US would have more effective outcomes and not fall into their tactics. Specifically, he notes:

Chinese negotiators tend to exploit the physiological dimension of interpersonal relations . . . intended to create obligations and attitudes receptive to psychological demands using shame, sympathy, criticism, and nonverbals . . . these techniques are effective in stimulating friendly or hostile responses that help the Chinese negotiator maintain the initiative. (Get 1996, 25)

As tensions begin to rise or a situation begins to escalate, it is important to understand how China and the US have operated in these environments. Andrew Scobell

and Larry Wortzel edited the works of six authors to compile *Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress*. This work reviews seven crisis situations and how the CCP responded to them. They note “China, the country often views itself as a victim and therefore strongly reacts to what it perceives as ‘unjust actions’ on the part of other countries and is therefore compelled to signal firm resolve through words and actions” (Scobell and Wortzel 2005, 2). The CCP’s style of “consensus leadership” has proven slow and unresponsive and the events leading to and after the 2002 massacre at Tiananmen Square furthers this observation (Scobell and Wortzel 2005, 2).

Additionally, the “prolonged and asymmetric negotiating strategy the Chinese used in both the EP-3 plane incident (2001) and Belgrade Embassy Bombing (1999) were successful in extracting concessions from and gaining an advantage over the US without causing serious damage in Sino-US relations” (Scobell and Wortzel 2005, 3). However, the authors caution that the CCP was “born, nurtured, and matured in a climate of turmoil routinely punctuated by crisis . . . and that China’s leaders even look to crisis as useful and even necessary to promote and preserve their rule” (Scobell and Wortzel 2005, 4). The CCP will use crises that are fabricated, anticipated, and unanticipated specializing in the first two (fabricated and anticipated). They cite “of greatest importance in a particular situation is to identify which type of crisis China is facing and then their behavior becomes more understandable, possibly predictable, enabling an external actor to devise the appropriate response” (Scobell and Wortzel 2005, 4).

As a crisis evolves and begins to deteriorate, the actors begin to consider their deterrent options and how the current environment either supports or negates those options. Part of a strategic culture lies in deterrence and “deterrence rests not so much on

the deterrer's will and ability to use military force, as on its adversary's perceptions of them" (Shulsky 2000, 33). Further, "if the party to be deterred does not perceive the deterrer's will and ability to act in the intended manner, deterrence may unexpectedly fail" therefore, understanding cultural factors at play is critical to a successful deterrent strategy (Shulsky 2000, 33). Adam Shulsky's study, backed by the RAND Corporation, on Chinese behavior and deterrence specifically addresses the current US strategy of strategic ambiguity to deter China from using force against Taiwan.

Specifically, the report cites that although the policy allows the US to get deterrence on the cheap by not committing automatically to any actions taken by the Chinese, the policy actually serves as a deterrent to both Taiwan and China by leaving doubt as to how the US would react (Shulsky 2000, 48). The flaw in this policy is that doubt leaves room for the aggressor to consider that the US will not act, leaving them undeterred, and potentially causing an "accidental war."

On the broader issue of deterrence (and noting China's willingness to use a crisis to their advantage as well as advantages offered by the current operating environment of the globalized and interdependent world) Shulsky notes:

A major question, which cannot be addressed here, would concern how China would see such tension affecting its economic development. If China believes that its economic development no longer requires close trade and financial relations with the United States or believes that such ties could survive heightened political-military tension, the way would be open to the use of "demonstrative" force, as in the past. On the other hand, if China believes that political-military tension would create serious economic disadvantages, this would be an important restraint. However, China's economic integration into the world also creates strong economic interests in the United States, which would be hurt by Sino-U.S. tension; hence, China might believe that the prospect of such tension would bring strong domestic pressure to bear on the U.S. government to take whatever steps might be necessary to avoid tension. (Shulsky 2000, 53)

The report concludes by encouraging the US to have a clear, transparent message demonstrating its will to use force and capability to do so with accuracy. Currently, the US NSS states, “Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities” (U.S. President, 2006, 47). In light of the RAND report’s observations, the current NSS may not be as clear as this research suggests it should be.

China recognizes the value and need for engagement, deterrence, and crisis control just as the US does in order to have a comprehensive and effective strategy. The *Science of Military Strategy* has complete chapters on both deterrence and crisis control. Ma’s article on national interests provides insight into these areas as well. Coordinated actions between diplomacy and military matters are the “two basic means of realizing national interests” and “diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments” (Ma 2005, 15). Ma notes that China’s understanding of the international environment involves, “certain military actions that are routine. . . . military training, military exercises, army movements, national defense research, arms testing . . . regularly become the targets of public discussion . . . and produce complicated social and international impacts” (Ma 2005, 15).

Ma cautions that military actions could upset the international environment in a way unfavorable to their interests and therefore, China must be mindful of the politics of military actions. He also cites deterrence as a valuable tool in the quiver of national options. He notes that non-war actions (arms control, military crisis management, counterterrorism, border control, international peacekeeping, and rescue operations) all play a role and in some instances can achieve strategic objectives (Ma 2005, 19). For a

peacetime strategy, Ma writes “controlling crisis before they happen, checking wars before they erupt, and realizing national political objectives using non-war means to the greatest extent possible are the best choices” (Ma 2005, 19).

Ma refers to deterrence and military crisis management as non-war techniques the Chinese should continue to research and understand. They allow China to maintain strategic flexibility, applicability, and initiative with the proper combination of war and non-war means. Finally, Ma discussed the importance of engagement via bilateral and multilateral agreements, military cooperation, joint exercises, activity in international organizations, and diplomatic relationships that are in China’s national interests as a way to increase her military security. He reminds his comrades, “we can only exhibit our will and influence in the system and in actions if we participate” (Ma 2005, 21).

This chapter reviewed the literature necessary to answer the research questions and provide the background data to support the analysis and recommendations of the thesis. The chapter reviewed the current operating environment, globalization’s impact on the current environment, identified areas of friction, provided a national and cultural view of the Sino-American relationship, and looked at the national strategies of both countries to explore the management options of engagement, deterrence, and crisis management to avoid a military conflict. The next chapter will provide an overview of the analytical methodology used to study the topic and the chapter will also address how the methodology will be applied to analyze the data and form conclusions or recommendations for further study.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY

The literature in chapter 2 provides an overview of the data available to study the thesis topic. The purpose of the thesis is to identify key friction points between the US and China, discover areas of interdependence, and discuss management options that can be used to minimize friction and avoid a military conflict. The study provides a focused look at the US-China relationship and offers insights into how the US NSS might reflect a more informed, tailored, and effective strategy with respect to China. Although cultural, economic, diplomatic, political, and military factors may be sources of friction between the two nations; this paper will focus only on those factors that may cause a military reaction from either nation. This chapter provides an overview of the analytical methodology used to study the topic and addresses how the methodology will be applied to analyze the data and form conclusions or recommendations for further study.

The analytical approach is based on the Regional Strategic Concept Estimate as taught by the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations at the US Army's Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Like other processes, this analytical problem solving process draws on a set of inputs, subjects them to analysis, and synthesizes them into a product (Wilcox and Menning 2007, C207RA-1). This process is based on operational frameworks found in U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and the U.S. Army's Field Manual 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*. The process seeks to “operationalize” national strategic guidance for an area of responsibility and flexibly applies the strategic considerations found in JP 3-0. Those strategic considerations are: (1) Statements of intent as to what, where, and how

operations are to be conducted in broad flexible terms; (2) Employment of full military capabilities with all Services, commands, multinational forces, and interagency resources; (3) Provide for unified action and strategic advantage wherein strategic advantage is the favorable overall relative power relationship that enables a group, nation or a group of nations to effectively control the course of politico-military events; and (4) Consider and integrate all elements of national power in gaining and maintaining strategic advantage (Wilcox and Manning 2007, C207RA-1). Overall, the process serves to take in varied inputs, analyze them, develop options, and provide a recommendation for action much like this thesis looks to provide recommendations to the US NSS (figure 3).




Figure 3. Strategic Concept Estimate Process Approach
Source: Mark R. Wilcox and Bruce W. Menning, "Guide to Regional Strategic Concept Development," in *C200 Strategic Studies: Advance Sheets and Readings Book*, (Fort Leavenworth KS: Government Printing Office, 2007), C207RA-2.

As discussed above, the strategic concept estimate is an intellectual framework integrating all instruments of national power based on analysis of some foundational data. Specifically, the process looks for information gathering in the areas of: strategic setting, current events, national guidance, and peacetime planning from both a friendly and adversary perspective. The strategic setting includes data on geopolitical considerations, history of the area, actors that can influence the area, source of the actors' power, the US domestic situation, and why the US cares about the area. Current event data covers what is changing in the area (political and military), what are the effects of those changes, and what actions have been taken lately. National guidance looks at the national interests of the actors involved, their policies and their bi- and or multi-lateral relationships. Finally, peacetime planning is relevant because in looking toward a strategy or concept of operation, it is important to understand what has already been done and what resources are available (Wilcox and Menning 2007, C207RA-3).

After the data has been gathered, analysis must be performed to produce a concept as an outcome of the process. The context and setting of the situation being analyzed provides a foundation for the analysis as the perspectives of all key actors are taken into account as the process works towards determining a course of action or recommendation to the problem at hand. The authors discuss using a comparison tool of actors to their interests, power available (DIME), strengths, weaknesses and likely actions (table 1).

Table 1. Strategic Concept Estimate Interests Comparison

| Actor | Interests | Power Available | Strengths | Weaknesses | Likely COAs |
|--|---|---|--|--|---|
| Nation-State, Non-state actor (e.g., IGO, NGO, trans-national group) | What is at stake for this actor in the given situation? | DIME -Diplomatic -Informational -Military -Economic | Which sources of power work towards the actor's advantage? | Which sources of power work to the detriment of the actor? | - Most Likely, Most Dangerous, Least Dangerous - Consider all elements of DIME |

Source: Mark R. Wilcox and Bruce W. Menning, "Guide to Regional Strategic Concept Development," in *C200 Strategic Studies: Advance Sheets and Readings Book*, (Fort Leavenworth KS: Government Printing Office, 2007), C207RA-5.

The outcome of the process' analysis is a recommendation for action by a decision-maker. The risk, cost, and benefit of an action are weighed using all sources of national power to ultimately shape a situation to a desired endstate. This analytical framework was provided to focus planners at a regional level, but, it also has applicability to focus planners at a national level. In analyzing the data for this thesis, the author uses the regional focus of the Strategic Concept Estimate with the US and China as the key state actors, their interests, power available, and interdependencies to provide recommendations for the US NSS seeking to avoid armed conflict with China. Therefore, the thesis will look at the regional issue and apply it backward to the NSS vice looking to apply the NSS into a regional course of action decision.

Specifically, the thesis methodology entails reviewing the strategic setting (current operating environment, globalization, sources of national power, and world views) for both the US and China. Then, the current events (China's charm offensive and recent military actions of both nations) will be studied to amplify the context of the strategic setting. Next, the national guidance (interests, policies, security strategies) will

be looked at in detail as it ties directly to the outcome the thesis looks to refine. This process should reveal known or potential friction points between the US and China and known or potential areas of interdependence as well. Finally, the ongoing peacetime planning or those plans already being executed in regards to the Sino-American relationship will be discussed (exercises, training, exchanges, economic, and diplomatic efforts). To synthesize the data, the US *NSS* will be evaluated to assess whether it is structured to address the friction points that have been identified, if it allows interdependence to be leveraged, and what management options could also be used to avoid military conflict. The outcome of this review and comparison methodology will provide a focused look at the US-China relationship and provide insights into how the US *NSS* could be shaped to enable a more informed, tailored, and effective strategy with respect to China.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter provides analysis of data found while researching the thesis using the Strategic Concept Estimate analytical methodology explained in chapter 3. It is organized into three main sections: friction points, interdependence, and management options. The purpose of the thesis is to identify key friction points between China and the US, discover areas of interdependence, and discuss management options that could be used to minimize friction and avoid a military conflict. The study provides a focused look at the US-China relationship and offers insights into how the US NSS might reflect a more informed, tailored, and effective strategy with respect to China. The thesis primary question is: What management options can be used to effectively influence China in order to manage the friction points, reinforce US-China economic interdependence, and ultimately avoid a military conflict? In order to answer the primary question, key secondary questions are:

1. What are the key friction points between the U.S. and China?
2. How are the U.S. and China economically interdependent?
3. What cultural aspects generate overriding principles in China's and the US' decision making about their national interests?
4. How does China develop their national strategy and what is their current strategy?
5. What is the intended endstate of China's military, economic, and diplomatic expansion and how does the US influence that endstate?

6. What alliances, treaties, or international organizations affect the US-China relationship, or could be leveraged to assure the peace?

7. What methods do we use to avoid a military conflict?

Friction Points

Before discussing management options, friction points and areas of friction that exist or could exist between the US and China must be defined. According to the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, friction is the clashing between two persons or parties of opposed views. Narrowing the areas of opposed views results in points of friction or friction points (*Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, s.v. “friction” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/friction> [accessed 3 February 2008]). For a Chinese perspective, no Chinese equivalent for the word “friction” was found in this research; however, several translated works do refer to areas of concern or friction points in regards to geopolitics. The national interests of both nations offer perhaps the most insight into areas of current or potential friction that may bring these two nations to a heightened crises point if left unmanaged.

Several Chinese authors offered insights into China’s national interests and how those interests bear on developing a national strategy. Peng and Yao discuss in *The Science of Military Strategy* those elements that determine strategy. Chief among those elements are the national interests of a nation that they identify as: national territory, national security, national sovereignty, national development, national stability, and national dignity. These elements are also found in Major General Ma Ping’s article, *National Interests and Military Security*. Ma’s work represents perhaps the most comprehensive and insightful Chinese perspective on the current national interests of

China (Ma 2005, 1). His article lays out how national interests are developed, what they currently are, and China's methods to strengthen her military, and therefore, secure her national interests. During the following detailed discussion of Ma's article, friction points will be identified and highlighted.

General Ma lays out three hierarchical levels of national interests. He defines core, major, and ordinary interests for China. Core interests are also vital interests and are the "basis and the lifeline for national survival and development" (Ma 2005, 5). Currently, he defines China's core interests as: "sovereign independence; territorial integrity; system security; and non-endangerment of the economic lifelines of national development" (Ma 2005, 5). He develops the concept of "core interests" further by saying three points must be assured. First, the interests should "cover the basic elements and conditions for national survival" defined as "the essential elements of territory, citizens, government, and sovereignty" (Ma 2005, 6). Second, the interests should "objectively reflect the primary threats the country faces" and, third, interests should assist in the management of the relationship between "national security and development" based on the conditions at the time (Ma 2005, 6).

As General Ma discusses China's national core interests one begins to see areas wherein friction is present or may develop between the US and China. While looking at threats to China, Ma relays, "unlike the West, China is far from resolving our development issues, and there also exists major threats to survival" (Ma 2005, 6). The first threat is the threat to their system of government. He notes the current low point in the global socialist movement and "conditions in which hostile western influences are intensifying their implementation of westernization and division strategies . . . the

socialist system has implications for the livelihood of the nation as well as the survival of the state, and must be protected as a core interest” (Ma 2005, 6). A second threat to national survival is territorial security. Ma clarifies,

For a nation, not all issues involving territory are issues of survival; the majority of border territory disputes or interest disputes that currently exist in China are local in nature, and fundamentally do not affect China’s survival and security as a whole. The Taiwan problem is [a] territorial security issue that involves national core interests, and this is also the area in which it is truly worthwhile to be prepared to go to war. (Ma 2005, 6)

The final element of national core interests according to Ma is the balance of national security with national development. He argues the prioritization of security and development depends on the conditions of the local and international environment, so these priorities are dynamic.

During peacetime, when large-scale war cannot be fought, development of the economy is the greatest policy and is the most fundamental interest of the people. However, if large-scale war occurs, then the only choice is to place survival first and develop the economy after the war is over. Ordinarily, we must handle security issues while upholding economic development at the center, focusing on development, and seeking security with development as the objective, not organizing the economy with security as the objective. (Ma 2005, 6)

In balancing security with development, this final essential element of core interests offers strategic priorities for the nation through carefully monitoring the external environment and reassessing the way ahead as a continual endeavor. This comprehensive look defines China’s concept of national security and national strategy. If one compares the core interests of China versus the US national interests one finds two of five friction points between the two countries.

The US NSS projects the “spread of freedom and democracy” as a core national interest (U.S. President 2006, 2). Specifically, “the goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and

conduct themselves responsibly in the international system . . . To protect our nation and honor our values, the US seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy” (U.S. President 2006, 3). In direct reference to China, the *NSS* outlines in Section VIII “Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power”:

Ultimately, China’s leaders must see that they cannot let their population increasingly experience the freedoms to buy, sell, and produce, while denying them the rights to assemble, speak, and worship. Only by allowing the Chinese people to enjoy these basic freedoms and universal rights can China honor its own constitution and international commitments and reach its full potential. (U.S. President 2006, 42)

As written, the US’s core national interest and stated objective for China is in direct conflict with China’s national interest and represents a “hostile western influence” threatening their socialist system of government and therefore, their national security.

Another example of how ideological approaches differ is in their diplomatic and business practices. As mentioned in chapter 2, Philippe Rogers’ highlights these differences and adds “as Beijing continues to expand operations in Africa, the likelihood of Chinese and American policies clashing will increase, possibly forcing underlying tensions into open conflict” (Rogers 2007, 25). He thinks China’s national objectives are economic expansion, international prestige, a unified China, and domestic stability while the US objectives for Africa are to promote good governance, market reform, regional security, and stability for the continent. Therefore, the US may perceive that China’s practices actually undermine the US’ goals. For China, US attempts to persuade changes in China’s foreign business practices or attempts to change China’s form of government no matter how slight or slow is a “threat to China’s core interest.”

Friction Point 1: Ideologically Differing Points of View

The US strategy to encourage the growth of democracy is also viewed by the CCP as encouraging and supporting the separatist movement in Taiwan to which China is vehemently opposed. Above, Ma noted territorial security as the second primary threat his country faces and specifically, the issue of Taiwan.

President Hu has made it clear that, “Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and China will continue to make every effort and endeavor with sincerity to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification of the two sides across the Taiwan Straits . . . however, we will never allow anyone to make Taiwan secede from China by any means” (Xinhua News Agency 2006). His assertion is reinforced in *China’s National Defense in 2006* wherein upholding the national security and unity of China includes safeguarding against separatist forces seeking Taiwan Independence (PRC 2006, 4).

The US NSS states that, “China and Taiwan must also resolve their differences peacefully, without coercion and without unilateral action by either China or Taiwan” (U.S. President 2006, 42). Further, President Bush has personally reassured President Hu that he will uphold the one-China policy, abide by the three Sino-US joint communiqués, and oppose “Taiwan independence” (Xinhua 2006). However, the US has continued to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, host Taiwanese officers in their schools, and conduct government and military exchanges under the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8 (1979). These actions aggravate China who calls into question US’ sincerity in complying with the three communiqués (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, 5).

Friction Point 2: Taiwan's Independence

Returning to Ma's hierarchical structure one encounters "major interests." These interests are "typically unlikely to be matters of life and death for a nation, but they are nonetheless important interests" and "weighing the costs and benefits, avoiding the use of military means as much as possible" (Ma 2005, 6-7). Currently, he outlines major interests as:

Normal operation of trades (industries) that have a material effect on the national economy and the livelihood of the people; unimpeded channels for the acquisition and transport of resources overseas; development and exploitation in key fields including the sea, space and electromagnetism; ensuring that control is maintained over regional hotspots that have an important effect on national security. (Ma 2005, 7)

The US NSS and *China's National Defense in 2006* highlight the national interest of both parties to retain access to foreign or world resources in order to provide for their people and secure their future as a growing economy. Access to resources is of interest to both countries and the denial of resources could be considered a threat to their national security. China is experiencing immense growth and the effects of globalization on its people, economy, and ecological system demand that they look to diversify and import resources. This effort has been labeled a "charm offensive" as China seeks out new partnerships to satisfy her nation's voracious appetite for petroleum, steel, coal, and natural gas. In addition, China's effort to expand her naval capabilities to a "blue water fleet" has brought increased attention with many nations asking her to define her intentions. China explains its need for an expanded naval fleet as a requirement to secure access to resources, protect its lines of communication, and ensure control over regional hotspots.

Ma cautions those who cast China's actions as "a geopolitical dispute over land power and sea power or as a dispute between an emerging major power and hegemonic major powers" (Ma 2005, 8). He states, "China's interest development path is neither colonization abroad nor a struggle for supremacy; rather, it is a path of peaceful development. Peaceful development is our basic national policy and our sincere aspiration . . . our ability to achieve peaceful development depends on both ourselves and the outside world" (Ma 2005, 7). General Ma points out that all eyes are on China and every move she makes toward the sea. He predicts, "the contest of strengths, with maritime blockades and counter-blockades, will be protracted, complex, and very difficult to avoid" (Ma 2005, 8). As China's development continues for access to foreign resources and markets she also needs to be assured access to maritime transport channels.

Our per capita resource reserve is low to begin with; with a population of 1.3 billion and growth rates in excess of 9%, reliance on domestic resources alone would make it difficult to support economic development, thus our dependence on foreign resources is constantly rising. At present, we depend on foreign sources for 40% of our oil . . . by 2010 that could reach 60% . . . other major mineral resources will increase by 2010--iron, copper, aluminum could reach 57%, 70%, and 80% respectively. It could be said the ability to securely obtain foreign resources has already begun to have lifeline significance for China's economic development . . . As China becomes a major exporter of finished goods, foreign markers [will] be crucial. In the past, threats to national security were primarily manifested as invasions of territory. Now, they could very well be primarily manifested as a blocking of foreign shipping channels or the destruction of foreign economic relations and contacts. (Ma 2005, 8-9)

The US NSS and *China's National Defense in 2006* both address the need for a stable international environment so that fair trade practices can flourish allowing the security of the nation by assuring access to natural resources abroad. In addition, both documents clearly state these objectives as critical to national security, and therefore, foremost in ensuring internal, regional, and international stability. However, the

documents differ in their approach and therefore represent areas for friction to develop as the US and China court access to natural resources.

There are concerns from the US that China is buying up energy properties and it is competing with the US and the rest of the world for energy. The NSS advises China's leaders to not hold onto the past and not take actions that would:

Exacerbate concerns throughout the region and the world by expanding trade, but acting as if they can somehow “lock up” energy supplies around the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up--as if they can follow a mercantilism borrowed from a discredited era; and supporting resource-rich countries without regard to the misrule at home or misbehavior abroad of those regimes. (U.S. President 2006, 4)

Even though China's stated intention is peaceful development out of sheer necessity, many question the manner in which China is going about securing access to resources or the methods they are using to obtain the actual resources. The effort by both China and the US to secure resource access or develop partnerships with foreign nations or businesses to guarantee access to natural resources represents the third area for friction between these two nations.

Friction Point 3: Access to Energy and Natural Resources

Also found within China's major interests is the “development and exploitation in key fields including sea, space, and electromagnetism” (Ma 2005, 6). The US posits that it is the right of all nations to be free from attack within the cyber and space domains. The US *NSS* Section IX, “Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the 21st Century,” established that the DOD must transform itself to meet traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges, defining disruptive challenges as those who employ capabilities in cyber and space

operations to counter new military advantages the US currently enjoys (U.S. President 2006, 44). These domains are the fourth and fifth major friction points between China and the US that could cause military intervention.

The cyber domain is of strategic importance for world trade and banking, communication, national security, international relations, and exchange of information. The PLA's strategy for conducting computer network attack and how the attack and defense need to be integrated into the larger "high-tech" warfare strategy is a telling statement of the importance of information warfare to China's military success and of information warfare's importance in their overall national strategy (East-Asia-Intel.com 2008).

The PLA's assertions are backed up by *The Science of Military Strategy, China's National Defense in 2006*, as well as General Ma's and General Liu's concepts for military modernization and gaining strategic advantage in the current environment. The US acknowledges the value of controlling or having freedom of movement within the cyberspace domain and has launched a Cyber Symposium to study these very concepts. The symposium will bring together industry, academia, government agencies, and the DOD to protect, defend, exploit, and attack in this domain. With both China and the US pursuing dominance of the cyber domain, cyber then represents the fourth area of friction that may cause a military response.

Friction Point 4: Freedom in the Cyber Domain

In looking into the next point of friction, space, both *China's National Defense in 2006* and the US report on *The Military Power of the People's Republic of China (PRC)* illustrate the sensitivity of this domain. The intrinsic value of using space as a means for

communication, navigation, command and control, commerce, and others are evident as well as the potential use of space by adversaries to deny the aspects above or as a means to strike one's adversaries. Both reports demonstrate the strategic value of space understood by the US and China and also demonstrate a genuine concern of either country regarding the use of space to deny or harm the other's sovereignty.

Recent launches of antisatellite weapons by both the US and China demonstrate their resolve to operate in this arena at will and remind the world that space's freedom of maneuver is a commodity to be fought for. As Commander Metzler's article pointed out in the literature review, China's space program offers diplomatic and military benefits to China's overall strategic power (Metzler 2007, 96-98). China desires to share intelligence, weather data, and other resource data with partners and to use their space program to broker new partnerships. Militarily, Generals Ma and Liu discuss the necessity to maneuver and survive in the space environment. General Liu's article details the strategic importance of space to China's transformation namely in integrated sensors, precision strike, navigation precision, automated command systems, and informationized warfare to deliver victory in the 21st Century. As in the cyber domain, with both countries vying for this shared resource, the freedom in the space domain is the last of the five major friction points found between the US and China that may cause a military response.

Friction Point 5: Freedom in the Space Domain

Finally, Ma writes that ordinary or general interests are the third and last hierarchical ranking of China's interests (Ma 2005, 7). This interest is kind of a catch-all and includes those interests whose "failure to value and satisfy can result in negative

effects on national security and development and include: general commercial interests, industrial interest, interests of Chinese nationals residing overseas, protection of citizen rights and interests, improvement of the ecological environment, development of cultural and education enterprises, safeguarding of social welfare, and so on” (Ma 2005, 7). This level of interest is not of immediate concern to national security as are core interests.

However, this interest encompasses several areas that concern the US. Specifically, human rights, freedom of speech, good governance, damage to the ecological environment, and pandemic disease. The US *NSS* notes:

China shares our exposure to the challenges of globalization and other transnational concerns. Mutual interests can guide our cooperation on issues such as terrorism, proliferation, and energy security. We will work to increase our cooperation to combat disease pandemics and reverse environmental degradation. (U.S. President 2006, 41)

So, although these are areas of concern here for both the US and China, they do not currently represent an area of friction between these two nations that would trigger a military conflict. They may be areas wherein the militaries may need to assist as in humanitarian relief or information exchange but not combatant forces. These interests actually represent areas of common purpose wherein the US and China may actually act together for the common good. Human rights and freedom of speech, of course, could also be areas of tension between these two nations based on their differing ideological points of view.

This section of chapter 4 has identified five major friction points between China and the US. Specifically they are: ideologically differing points of view, Taiwan’s independence, access to natural resources, freedom in the cyber domain, and freedom in

the space domain. The next section will discuss areas of interdependence between the US and China that should be understood when assessing risk and managing friction.

Interdependence

Even though the US and China view the world differently because of their history, culture, sociology, religion, environment, and form of government, there are interdependencies that should be acknowledged. As discussed in chapter 2, Pang observes China's role in the international environment is greatly influenced by the Sino-American relationship and that no matter how strong the US is, China must be perceived as strong, relevant, and as a "firm force safeguarding world peace, not a force challenging world peace" (Pang 2002).

Pang also relayed the concept of "security deficit" wherein, as states become interdependent the risk to their security actually rises because it trades what it can provide for itself for what it can get from another state leading to an actual "security deficit." The US provides security and stability to the Pacific region and the world because of its military capability and ability to project power. Therefore, if the US is unable or unwilling to continue in this role, who would "fill the gap?" China realizes that though they do not prefer US presence in their "backyard," the US' presence in Asia actually strengthens China's security and at least currently, is needed allowing her to focus within and maintain her domestic policies.

In addition to military interdependence, there is also diplomatic and economic interdependence between the US and China. Diplomatically, Presidents Hu and Bush acknowledge areas of common purpose and concern whereby in the meetings over the last few years, they have agreed that China and the US share significant strategic interests

and that sound relations between the two countries are crucial to promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the world. China's official website (www.china.org.cn.org/english) commented:

As Sino-U.S. relations continue to grow, China and the United States have been finding more and more common stakes in international affairs. The two countries have coordinated positions and cooperated in such fields as the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues, antiterrorism and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The two countries have also reached consensus on maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. China is the largest developing country in the world, while the United States is the largest developed country. Harmony between the two countries will bless both sides whereas collision will wreck both. Hence, China and the United States must deepen communication and mutual understanding, and enhance the building of consensus and confidence. Friendly relations between the two countries will not only benefit the two peoples but also promote world peace. (China Facts and Figures 2007, Relations with Major Powers)

In that vein, it appears the leaders of the two countries continue to communicate with each other and have reached consensus on promoting constructive and cooperative bilateral relations. In July 2006, President Hu met with President Bush again on the sidelines of the outreach session of the Group of Eight (G8) summit in St. Petersburg, Russia. And, later in November, the two presidents held in-depth talks while attending the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting in Hanoi, Viet Nam. They exchanged views on regional and international issues of common concern. Frequent meetings between heads of state and other high-ranking officials signal a new level in Sino-US political relations (China Facts and Figures 2007, Relations with Major Powers). Finally, the Six Party Talks to denuclearize the Korean peninsula provides diplomatic interdependence between the US and China wherein they seek resolution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and while doing so, achieve greater understanding, trust, and cooperation with each other in turn.

The exchange of ideas and shared solutions to problems has also been spurred by globalization. Both *China's National Defense in 2006* and the US NSS address the impacts, effects, and ways to work in the globalized world environment. The specific concerns are trade imbalances, political influence, ecological challenges, pandemic disease, and terrorism. Evidence of globalization's effect on interdependency are the political and economic ties that have grown over the last twenty years between the US and China. China is actively involved in thirty-seven partnerships spanning bilateral, regional, and multilateral organizations to include holding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Medeiros 2007, 38-39).

In addition to the military and diplomatic interdependencies noted above, economic interdependency can also be found as evidenced by the trading boom between the US and China. Since 1978, China's gross domestic product has increased by a factor of forty, with a 10.7 percent growth rate making it the fourth largest economy in the world (Freeman 2007). The US is China's second-largest trading partner, and China is now the third-largest trading partner for the US (after Canada and Mexico) (U.S. Department of State 2007a). China's entrance into the WTO in 1991 aided her economy, allowed increased international access to her economy, and brought her out of isolation and into the international community. The Chinese Ambassador to the United States Zhou Wenzhong cites, "In just the twenty-seven years after the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations, the bilateral trade volume surged from the less than 2.5 billion US dollars in 1979 to the 211.6 billion US dollars in 2005, an increase of 80 times" (Zhou 2006).

In addition, Tailan Chi, an Associate Professor of Business Administration at the University of Kansas presented a talk titled, “Globalization and China’s Integration into the World Economy” to the international students of the US Army’s Command and General Staff College in December 2007. His insights are particularly of interest as Dr. Tailan worked as a business negotiator for a major Chinese trading company before coming to the US. He has advised companies in the US on doing business in China and Pacific Asia. In the brief, he stated that in 2004, China accounted for one-third of the rise in world oil consumption and that specialization of the market in China has resulted in 70 percent of the world’s cigarette lighters, 30 percent of the world’s socks, and 25 percent of the world’s neckties (Tailan 2007). Further, he cites lower prices for world consumers and increased revenues for producers of raw materials and machinery as “joys to the world” while noting the success has had a price or impact for the environment, international relations, and social cohesion within China (Tailan 2007).

When the world is more globalized or interdependent, it is stronger but submitting globalization has inherent risk for nations. Once a nation relies on or becomes solely dependent on another to provide for their populace runs contrary to the idea of “sovereignty” because it puts a nation’s stability at risk if the means to provide is cut-off or minimized. In other words, committing to globalization and allowing another entity to provide for your citizens is to forfeit a portion of your sovereignty and increases your reliance on that entity to exist.

To the good, many believe the effect of globalization will actually bring more peace to the world because nations are more reliant on each other and therefore, warring with each other is actually not in either’s best interest or the world’s interest. This section

has outlined how the US and China rely on each other (security, stability, economically, world order, international terrorism). It has also discussed how these areas of interdependence should be used in assessing risks but also points out that these areas of interdependence can be leveraged to negotiate, coax, persuade, dissuade, or deter either nation in times of heightened tensions by realizing common interests. The next section will discuss what actions can be taken to address the five identified friction points and how interdependency may play a role in those actions.

Friction Point Management Options

Despite current efforts to cooperate and realize interdependencies, the reality is that friction points remain between China and the US. Ways available to manage friction via elements of national power are comprehensive national strategies that seek to engage, deter, manage crisis, or if conflict is unavoidable, use military intervention. In light of the stated interdependencies, it seems more prudent to use all means (except the latter) to seek resolution of friction points between the US and China and avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Avoiding bloodshed is debatable depending on the risk to the interest at hand; however, the costs of a conflict between these two nations outweigh many of the costs of previous conflicts. Specifically, the economic intermingling of these nations and the impact on the world economy let alone the sheer size of the armed forces, landmass, population, and the eventual reconstruction of the nations' infrastructures would result in a host of consequences for every region of the world.

To put things into perspective, Germany has been rebuilding since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Federal government subsidies, heavily supported by the EU and UN, have been used to support, rebuild, and grow the economy, infrastructure, industry, and

essential services. In September 2005, a team of government consultants, headed by former Hamburg Mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi and the former head of the East German State Bank and subsequent managing director of Deutsche Bank's Berlin office, Edgar Most, presented Manfred Stolpe, the cabinet minister charged with eastern reconstruction, with a 29-page report, "Recommendations for a Change in Direction for Development East" that found, "to this day, the East is still unable to survive without government subsidies amounting to some €70 to €80 billion Euros (109 to 125 billion US dollars) a year" (Berg, Winter, and Wasserman 2005). Many observers refer to the 2.49 percent economic growth from 1991 to 2003 costing \$1.24 trillion as "the price of a failed reunification" (Berg, Winter, and Wasserman 2005).

Juxtaposing this experience on China would involve an estimate of rebuilding the world's third largest nation and providing for 1.3 billion people not to mention the sheer enormity of the task of just providing a common framework for a nation of 56 ethnicities who speak 73 languages. This does not begin to account for the US territory, economy, infrastructure, and populace. The enormity of this task makes the effort in Iraq and Afghanistan minuscule in comparison. With these stakes, the US must aggressively work to maintain an interdependent globalized world with a comprehensive strategy that achieves its goals and seeks to leverage strengths for the betterment of the international community, China, and the US. Therefore, what does one do about the identified friction points that may serve as triggers for conflict and how does one allow themselves to prepare for future, currently unknown, friction points?

Ideologically Differing Points of View

Five points have been identified, the first of which is the ideologically differing points of view between the US and China. At the core of this friction point, there is no common ground between the two ideologies. The US seeks to “spread freedom and democracy” and China, which seeks to “preserve their socialist government,” believes the West is a “hostile influence and threatens their national sovereignty.” National interests may at times be at odds with each other and a nation has to decide which is more important than the other for the time being.

Specifically, the US’ push for democracy and its desire to “ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade” are in direct competition with each other with respect to China (U.S. President 2006, 1). The US has to decide which takes precedence at this time and for the next ten years. If China is opening up to the world economically due to her own national need, working to bring her into the internationally accepted business practices of free trade and markets may be more important than pushing for political reformation. Since the CCP views such a reformation as a threat to their existence, instead of needling that point, let the international access, globalization, and market influences produce change within China as a matter of course. Over time, these influences, if successful, will allow Chinese society and the younger members of the Politburo to view the West not as a “hostile influence” and Politburo members may, in time, be more acceptable of political change as their society demands it. The US should not abandon its efforts to expand democracy and encourage better governance inside China, but more patience may allow stronger and less emotionally tied forces to shape the environment. Therefore, the US strategy could be less pointed towards

the heart of the CCP so as not to excite their worst fears of loss of power and more directly focus on the international partnerships, free and fair markets, and global concerns of transnational terrorism, pandemic disease, ecological preservation, and regional concerns to strengthen nations, and remove threats to international peace. This strategy would encourage business engagement over ideological engagement as well as serve as a deterrent to conflict.

Taiwan's Independence

The next friction point, independence for Taiwan, is closely tied to the first friction point. Currently, the status quo of “one China, two systems” seems to be working but it is a delicate framework. The current political change in Taiwan that is bringing Nationalist agendas to the forefront may resolve this issue sooner than later. Taiwan held elections in March 2008 that were determined to be fair, and they overwhelmingly voted for the Nationalist party and Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou. Ma promises to hold to the “three no’s” (no unification, no independence, and no use of force). But, what would happen if Taiwan has an election and the party that wins seeks to bring Taiwan fully under CCP control with a socialist government, will the US honor that election? How will that impact the Taiwan Relations Act? China contends that US policy toward Taiwan is ambiguous since the US agrees with the “one China, two systems,” but also supplies Taiwan with advanced weaponry as a hedge against the one China policy. The *NSS, National Military Strategy, and the State Department’s Strategic Plan of Transformational Diplomacy 2007-2012* all fall short of management this friction point. In light of all factors at play, this is probably prudent. However, since part of America’s armed forces mission is to “prevent conflict” her presence, activities, and actions in the

region may actually escalate the tensions. Therefore, to keep this friction at bay, the US should maintain the status quo and allow Taiwan to follow their political course while continuing to support their economic growth and modernization. The continued presence of US advisors, port calls, sponsorship of student exchanges, and other actions under the Taiwan Relations Act should continue and though it may seem ambiguous to the Chinese, that ambiguity actually adds to the US' strength. It keeps China guessing and therefore, not giving a clear signal for her to act. Ambiguity then is also an aspect of the US' policy with China because it provides elements of engagement and deterrence.

Access to Energy and Natural Resources

The third friction point is the access to natural resources. Imbedded in this friction point are the issues of fair business practices, ecological stewardship, concerns of “locking up” resources, and support for tyrannical or unjust regimes. All are areas of concern for the international community and the US. Increasing the economic and diplomatic pressures on China may force her to play better in the international market and may potentially check her actions by offering better alternatives. The West is known for assistance with “strings attached” whereas China conducts its business straight up and demands no actions from the receiving country by way of reforms, governance, human rights, and others. The US and the international community cannot turn a blind eye to this practice as it encourages among populations a breeding ground ripe for terrorist influences sowing the seeds of instability, poverty, and despair. The US should lean harder on the UN, EU, African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the World Bank, WTO, and other organizations and partnerships to convince China to change their ways. This influence might also encourage nations at risk to do business

elsewhere. The US also needs to create her own “charm offensive” to gain a foothold in areas where it needs access to natural resources (Africa) and use its exclusive capabilities like off-shore oil extracting technology and agricultural prowess to secure that foothold. Last, the US should use China’s pursuit of resources and her agreement to support the US in the war on terror to help shape China’s business practices in the region. Thus other issues of importance to China can be used in the US’ engagement policy.

Cyberspace

The US should look to the international community for assistance with the final two friction points, the freedom of the cyber and space domains. These domains enable international trade, navigation, commerce, governance, security, communication, ecological management, medical assistance, and relief after natural disasters to be possible. They also provide means by which nations can protect and defend themselves. The US must act in order to protect her ability to enjoy freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum. There are international treaties and conventions for civil aviation, piracy, search and rescue, law, and maritime matters. In line with Gao’s assertions, it is time for the same protocols to be in-place for the domain of cyber. The US should push for the creation of an international monitoring body for cyber just as one exists for nuclear and space affairs. The protocols should seek to normalize the use of the cyber domain, foster international agreement on accepted uses of the domain, and ensure the safety of the environment not only for the information exchanged but also the databases and applications cyber allows.

In order to maintain the use of cyber and to ensure national security, the US must invest heavily in the cyber mission. As the adversaries continue to shift from traditional

military actions towards asymmetric capabilities the array of irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges will only increase. The cyber domain along with the space domain is the lynchpin for securing US national interests and more importantly, its sovereignty. A strong deterrent defense and attack capability is the only way to begin to ameliorate this friction point. Even though there are interdependencies in this area, if China perceives itself to have an overmatched strength, the interdependency will not matter. If this arena is conceded to China, the US will not be able to maintain global power and influence. The US must strengthen this area to engage with but also to serve as a deterrent towards China.

The Space Domain

The last identified friction point is freedom in the space domain. Much like the cyber domain, the US must maintain a first rate capability in space and not allow China to gain or perceive itself to gain a strategic advantage in space. America's ability to project power into space fosters international development, scientific advancement, world economies, and communication. Threats to this domain cannot be tolerated and the US must continue to lead the way to check any action by China or anyone else that threatens the free use and enjoyment of space for all nations. Strength and cooperation are essential and the US strategy must increase its emphasis in this area to not only assure dominance for world partners but also to deter China from using this arena offensively.

General Ma Ping, Mr. Thomas, Admiral Fallon, and Mr. Krepinevich provide foundational ideas that explain the nature of the Sino-American relationship. They, with others, provide insight into how the US can have a strategy that acknowledges areas of friction and employ ways to ameliorate them. This chapter has identified the friction

points, interdependencies, and management options available to assist decision makers in drafting a comprehensive strategy that seeks to avoid conflict with China. Chapter 5 will offer potential adjustments to the US *NSS* and recommend areas for further study.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The thesis has identified key friction points between China and the US, discovered areas of interdependence, and discussed management options that could be used to minimize friction and avoid a military conflict. The study provided a focused look at the US-China relationship and offered insight into how the US NSS might reflect a more informed, tailored, and effective strategy with respect to China. The thesis primary question was: “What management options can be used to effectively influence China in order to manage the friction points, reinforce US-China interdependence, and ultimately avoid a military conflict?” Using the strategic concept estimate methodology, chapter 2 provided the data inputs (strategic setting, national guidance, culture, globalization, world view, and national vulnerabilities) to identify friction points that could cause a military response (ideology, Taiwanese independence, access to resources, cyber, and space domains) and chapter 4 provided the output of management options to mitigate the friction and possibly avoid armed conflict.

Conclusions

Initially seven areas of friction were identified in chapter 1. However, the thesis identified five major friction points that may lead to a military conflict as: ideologically differing points of view, Taiwan’s independence, access to natural resources, freedom in the cyber domain, and freedom in the space domain. Although cultural, economic, diplomatic, political, and military factors may be sources of friction between the two nations; this paper only focused on those factors that may cause a military reaction from

either nation. The other two areas (presence in each other's perceived "backyard" and vying for regional leadership in the Asia-Pacific region) were considered agitating factors to the main five friction points identified; however, if they transition fully into friction points, they may be areas for future study.

Areas of interdependence were found in military or security ties in the Asia-Pacific region, intertwined economies, and international diplomatic ties via partnerships, agreements, and organizations. Interdependence should be used in assessing risks and can also be leveraged to negotiate, coax, persuade, dissuade, or deter either nation in times of heightened tensions by realizing common interests. Specifically, one way to leverage interdependence is for the US to bring off-shore oil extraction technology to African nations to allow more resources to be available, a capability neither Africa nor China currently possess. This brings American business and presence to Africa, increases oil revenues for the continent, and allows China access to those resources that otherwise would go untapped.

Globalization was found to be a significant factor to both friction and interdependence. In addition, the effects of globalization were found to actually bring more peace to the world because nations are more reliant on each other and therefore, warring with each other may not actually be in either's best interest or the world's interest. Security deficits, economic cooperation, technological advances, and increased information exchange are all areas where globalization adds to the common good. Risks from globalization were acknowledged as pandemic disease, transnational terrorism, ecological degradation from development, and weapons proliferation.

In keeping with the methodology, the management options of engagement, deterrence, and crisis management were discussed to investigate how they could be used to manage friction and leverage the known interdependencies in an effort to avoid conflict. These options are essential to managing friction via the elements of national power (DIME) as part of a comprehensive national strategy that seeks to avoid military conflict. Knowing more now about the China-US relationship and friction points, engagement methods to manage the five friction points may be as discussed earlier to continue to increase business opportunities with regional partners in Asia and Africa, and bilaterally between the US and China. Increased diplomatic and military cooperation are essential to understanding the ideological differences and can occur via USPACOM and the US State Department's strategies for the region. Specific areas are: UN peacekeeping operations, mil-to-mil exchanges and joint exercises or patrols, non-governmental organization information sharing for humanitarian operations, and cooperation within intergovernmental organizations to seek remedies for natural resource technologies, alternative sources, and conservation initiatives. For cyberspace and space, furthering protocols of common practice and encouraging pursuits to enable these mediums to continue to enrich and protect the lives of humankind should be sought in all aspects of the DIME.

Deterrence is the second management option discussed to manage the five friction points as part of a comprehensive strategy. Specifically, ambiguity was noted as a deterrent for Taiwan's independence. By the US supporting Taiwan and the joint communiqués' it leaves both China and Taiwan a little uncertain as to what the US would do and thereby inhibits offensive actions. The ideology friction point is a bit harder to

deter in that it is at the core of both nation's identity and interests. However, mutual understanding and cultural awareness serves to mitigate this friction and may deter conflict arising from this area. For natural resources, technological or market presence in areas where the US can secure a niche' would force cooperation and negotiation by being a "controlling" party. However, as many of the authors cited have cautioned, gaining a controlling or exclusive role may not deter but actually cause a trade war with China.

The cyber and space domains offer delicate areas for deterrence so as not to incite an arms race in either domain. However, some actions could be taken to deter offensive use of either domain. Establishing an intranet vice Internet could partition key command and control, banking, and environmental systems and infrastructure protecting them from widespread attack. If the target is harder to reach, attackers are usually deterred and pursue softer targets. For space, fostering economic, scientific, and diplomatic cooperation for the pursuit of space exploration and enjoyment allows this domain to be more than a "military one" making space weapons taboo allowing international pressure to serve as the deterrent for weaponizing space. Finally, just as having a potent and credible nuclear force led to effective deterrence, so should the US pursue a potent and credible cyber and space force to deter adversary offensive actions (Wu 1999, 4).

For the last of the three management options, crisis management as part of an overall strategy serve to prevent crisis before they occur, diffuse a rapidly rising situation, or quickly resolve a crisis after it has occurred. One of the largest misperceptions of the Chinese people and CCP (unfortunately promulgated in part by the NSS) is that the US seeks to overthrow their form of government and that every action in the region is part of this larger endstate. Political tension and miscalculations from this differing ideology

friction point exacerbates all others. The US should anticipate this friction point and monitor its actions, communications, and policies so as to not to trigger a crisis. Continued foreign policy engagement, social interaction, tourism, trade, and cultural exchanges will serve to assist in this area. Only then with societal understanding could the US persuade the Chinese people that the US does not seek this endstate. For the independence of Taiwan, decision makers must understand that for China, a war with the US is a better alternative than allowing independence for Taiwan. Therefore, continuing the status quo is really best for all parties involved and the region. Managing this point with informed and skillful negotiation, communication, and an overall better understanding of the crisis management process for each nation is vital. A hotline between these two nation's national leaders, in addition to the already agreed upon between the PLA and DOD, would serve as a direct link and as one avenue to quickly resolve crises regardless of which of the five friction points are involved.

So, does the *NSS* serve as a tool, in part, to manage friction between the US and China or does it actually contribute to the friction? In looking at the two cultures and perspectives, the *NSS*, from a Chinese perspective contributes to the friction. From their perspective, the *NSS* is hostile and serves as a focal point the CCP can use to assert that the West intends to destroy the very government and socialist society they hold dear. At face value, it is hard to find fault with their logic and begs the question, "Does the US ratchet back its *NSS* to make it more palatable for the Chinese and encourage change at a pace they can adapt to?" Understanding cultural differences is imperative for any strategy to be more successful and some cultural differences between US and China were addressed, specifically in dealing with national interests, ideology, and crisis

management. From the research, it is apparent that the ideological and governmental differences are almost impenetrable to change by either side. Not as an effort to acquiesce but in the interest of effectiveness, the *NSS* should be tempered to put economic and social engagement over ideological and governmental change in China.

The thesis also explored the “cost” or “risk” associated with not managing friction between the US and China. Essentially, the identified areas are manageable; the nations have to decide if those friction points are worth the enormous cost to themselves and the world by not addressing them. Ideological differences will remain; the US has to decide if having a socialist China is worth avoiding a potential trade war that may ensue if the democratization ideal is pushed upon China. Maintaining the “one China, two systems” policy maintains the status quo, allows Taiwan some independence, and calms the friction between these two nuclear armed countries. The pursuit of resources will not subside any time soon, so the US has to use its exclusive technological powers and influence to manage risk in this area. Finally, the last two domains of cyber and space must remain free for all nations and the US as the world leader must assure this access.

No one instrument of power will win the day versus a rising China. Although options besides conflict have been discussed, the reality is the US must pursue a comprehensive strategy and has to prepare for war if all other options fail. The challenge is to prepare for the right one. China is preparing for asymmetric war (local war under high tech conditions) knowing they cannot compete in a conventional or traditional fight projecting power. As the two friction points of cyber and space reveal, it is imperative the US buttress this capability to not only secure access but to also ensure she can defend herself from and through those domains.

China's aggressive international pursuit of resources and influence will continue due to the economic expansion and social reforms ongoing in China. This pursuit will continue to challenge the status quo and force US decision makers to reevaluate their perceptions of China's intentions. During the evaluation of China's intentions, decision makers must weigh the total cost of armed conflict with China. Conflict is defined herein as a force on force conventional fight (non-nuclear). In that vein, for this thesis, it is assumed that war with China is unnecessary to meet US national objectives, and the thesis has explained why efforts to avoid conflict are in the US and China's national interests.

If China does seek to maintain the integrity of its people and territory, assure her neighbors of her intentions, maintain a favorable and stable international environment, and diversify its access to natural resources it needs to continue to engage international partners, like the US, to maintain inertia and build trust (Medeiros 2007, 34). China has changed but they need to stay in balance as they change, and US decision makers need to realize that the West's idea of time and results do not play out in Eastern cultures.

Recommendations

Understanding where interests coincide and the strategies of both nations provide avenues for effective cooperation. "Engagement achieves important national security goals such as preventing nuclear proliferation, defeating global terrorism, defusing regional conflicts, fostering global economic growth, and championing aspirations for human dignity" (Lum and Nanto 2007, 2). The study provided a focused look at the US-China relationship and offers the follow insights into how the US NSS might reflect a more informed, tailored, and effective strategy with respect to China. Three overall

recommendations are: (1) The US *NSS* could be modified to place economic and international partnerships ahead of spreading democracy and social and religious freedoms into China. Both goals are priorities for the US but with respect to China are actually in competition with each other; (2) The *NSS* could place more emphasis on cultural training, language, crisis management processes, and history for national departments as part of the current task “work with others to defuse regional conflicts” (U.S. President 2006, 15); (3) Finally, the State Department’s Strategic Plan and the Defense Department’s National Defense and Military’s strategies be modified to more directly confront the identified friction points and reprioritize engagement with China vice primarily focusing on hedging against those successes and planning for war.

So, how does the US move forward with China as a rising economic, diplomatic, and military power? Can the US strategy actually encourage China to change in a way that is conducive to US interests? Is China’s growing economic power really about building a base for future hegemonic actions? Does the economic superiority of China represent a noose around America’s neck in the future? Is the US defense budget a liability or a strategic asset? Has democratization become the social Darwinism of our time but, in doing so, actually incites a provocative response from China giving them a pretext for conflict? Has the US waved the flag of “survival of the fittest is democracy” too high and too far? Many questions remain and offer areas to explore as the US grapples with a rising China. However the US moves forward, it must acknowledge the rise of China and decide if it wants to view her as a challenge, threat, or an opportunity.

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